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Abstract 
The study of intractable conflicts has risen in recent years particularly with the 
work of Daniel Bar-Tal’s work on the ethos of conflict. The ethos of conflict is an 
original psychological concept that captures the collective societal mindset of cultures 
locked in intractable conflicts and examines the various factors that keep groups in 
conflict or help them towards peace. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is arguably the most 
researched, publicized, and discussed intractable conflict in history. The purpose of this 
paper is to first examine the foundation of that intractable conflict through the lens of 
Bar-Tal’s theory and apply it once more how it has changed in the modern day. 
Particularly, this paper focuses on how the change in power structure in the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict has prioritized the different elements of the ethos of conflict 
differently for both sides. In the beginning of the conflict, both groups held equitable 
power that caused them to have similar manifestations of the ethos of conflict. Working 
with the foundation of Bar-Tal’s theory, this paper provides an analysis of how Israel’s 
rise to power in the conflict influences different prioritizations of the ethos of conflict for 
both parties. 
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Introduction 
 The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most widely publicized intractable 
conflicts of our time. While other intractable conflicts such as the ongoing struggle 
between Russians and the Chechens have been going on for longer (the Russia-Chechen 
conflict dates back to 1785) and other conflicts such as the Hutu-Tutsi conflict in Rwanda 
have seen higher degrees of violence including genocide, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
is widely known and present throughout the international community. The Israeli-
Palestinian conflict features a unique clash or nationalistic cultures: the Jewish-Israeli 
identity, forged out of the culmination of a near 2,000 year diaspora following the 
dissolution of ancient Israel in 70 C.E. and the Palestinian identity, fashioned out of an 
offshoot of Pan-Arab-Nationalism following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in 1917. 
Following the beginning of Zionism in the late nineteenth century, there have been 
contentions and violent clashes between the Jews returning to the land and the 
Palestinian-Arabs who were living there in modern times. As rising anti-Semitism pushed 
more and more Jews towards the area these clashes became more frequent and grew in 
intensity.  
 Following the Second World War Zionists succeeded in their push for partitioned 
land from the newly formed United Nations and immediately engaged in a battle for its 
survival in the Israeli Independence War of 1948. The Israelis managed to stave off 
multiple Arab armies and the Jewish people secured their first independent state since the 
fall of ancient Israel. While the Israelis celebrated their victory, the Arab world and the 
Palestinians in particular mourned its defeat. In the event that Palestinians would later 
refer to as “al-nakba” (the travesty), hundreds of thousands of refugees fled or were 
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expelled from the land Israel claimed. Arabs left in the land were granted Israeli 
citizenship but held under martial law until 1966. Ben Gurion, the Israeli Prime Minister, 
wrote a letter to the United Nations in 1949 insisting that the Palestinian refugees be 
absorbed into the neighboring Arab States.  
Tensions were high between the new neighbors as Israel was boxed in by hostile 
Arab armies on all sides. These tensions culminated in the Six Day War in 1967. Through 
a series of preemptive airstrikes and successive ground invasions, Israel won a decisive 
victory and gained the Sinai Peninsula and Gaza Strip from the Egyptians, the West Bank 
of the Jordan River from Jordan, and the Golan Heights from Syria. Specifically, the 
conquering of the West Bank from Jordan in 1967 and Jordan’s eventual renucniation of 
their claims to it in 1988 would set the framework of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
exploding refugee population of Palestinians living in neighboring countries, sometimes 
at their degradation and mortal risk (Black September in Jordan, ISIS’ control of 
Yarmouk in Syria) has worsened the conflict over the years. However, the focus of the 
issue is concentrated in the West Bank: the area conquered by the Israelis in the Six Day 
War. The Palestinians forced there in the Independence War and subsequently conquered 
in 1967 argue that they are living under occupation, and the growing nationalism that 
started in the early twentieth century chafes against Israeli governance in growing 
violence. Israel has so far withstood two intifadas; the first being from 1987-1993 and the 
second from2000-2005. Arabic for “sweeping out,” there appears to be a third intifada 
brewing at the writing of this thesis (Chandler, 2015). Those in control of the West Bank, 
in addition to the Palestinian-held Gaza Strip (relinquished by Israel in 2005), seeks the 
removal of Israeli presence from any land conquered in the Six Day War.  
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The Israelis claim that the Palestinians seek to destroy Israel altogether and that 
they deny Jews’ right to return to their homeland. Palestinians argue that Israel is 
displacing the indigenous population to make room for the colonist initiative that is 
Zionism. The conflict’s story is incredibly rich and contains many elements that make it 
unique unto itself; however, it contains many of the same elements ubiquitously found in 
intractable conflicts. In his book Intractable Conflicts: Socio-Psychological Foundations 
and Dynamics, Daniel Bar-Tal introduces his theory of an ethos of conflict. 
  
Ethos of Conflict 
According to Bar-Tal, an ethos provides a dominant orientation to society, 
illuminates the present state of affairs and conditions, and sets goals for the future. It 
provides an epistemic basis for the hegemonic social consciousness of the society and for 
the future direction it takes. An ethos indicates to society members that their behavior is 
not based on random beliefs but represents a coherent and systematic pattern of 
knowledge. There are several criteria that indicate if a societal belief constitutes an ethos: 
the beliefs are known to all society members, even if they do not agree with them, they 
appear in public debates as arguments of justification and explanation (in mass media and 
other channels), they serve as a basis for influencing policies and decisions, they appear 
as major themes in various cultural products like literature and films, and the beliefs 
constitute major themes transmitted to younger generations e. they appear in societal 
expressions like ceremonies and rituals. 
 Ethos of conflict can evolve over time, but holistically contains eight themes. 
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Justness of one’s own goals. According to Jost and Banaji’s Theory of System 
Justification (1994), society members cannot accept conflict goals as random and 
unjustified. The adoption of group goals herald the beginning of the conflict and explain 
why the inconsistencies between group goals led to violence. Group goals need to first be 
formally or informally agreed upon within a group in order to recognize how the 
opposing group obstructs them. This understanding of how the other group obstructs the 
goal justifies the conflict with the other group. The justification for conflict goals can be 
historical, economical, theological, cultural, and are frequently embedded in national or 
ethnic ideology. Some goals are viewed as reflecting sacred values and can concern 
elements like holy sites, “homeland” territories, or vital resources. Goals that are based 
off of sacred values are called “moral mandates,” and are therefore immune to rational 
tools that would perhaps challenge their validity or interchangeability with other goals 
(Skitka, (2002). These goals are especially inflexible because compromising them reflects 
a violation of group ethics (Landman, 2010). The rigidity of moral mandates is crucial to 
the duration of intractable conflict; because they are seen as non-negotiable, groups will 
spend decades or generations locked in stalemate. A group will simultaneously present 
their goals as just while discrediting the opponent’s as unjust or contradictory or 
obstructive to their own.   
 
Opponent delegitmization. Delegimization of an opponent has many aspects. 
Delegitimizing opponents magnifies the difference between groups, removes 
individuality within the other group and presents it as an overall evil entity, assigns them 
hatred, anger, fear, disgust and implies the potential for negative/evil behavior, implies 
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that they do not deserve to be treated humanely, implies measures should be taken to 
prevent the harm they might inflict. The last two are especially important because they 
legitimize hurting the rival group.  
 There are several methods groups use in order to delegitimize their opponents a. 
dehumanization: using demonizing, zoological, or medical terms to describe other group, 
(Jahoda, 1999), (Wistrich, 1999), (Savage, 2007), out-casting: characterizing the 
opponent as groups that violate pivotal social norms (murderers, psychopaths, rapists) 
(Bar-Tal, 1988), trait characterization: assigning the group negative traits (aggressors, 
idiots) (English, Halperin,1987), and political labelization: likening the opponent to 
negatively perceived political groups (Nazis, Zionists) (Bronfenbrenner, 1961). 
 In regards to the process of deligitmizaiton, the term “enemy” is very important. 
The enemy connotes an armed struggle and also clearly places it on the other side of 
idealogical, social, and moral norms. “The enemy is a stranger; a faceless, barbarous, 
greedy criminal; and a sadistic and immoral aggressor. The enemy is often presented in 
depersonalized abstract terms as a torturer, rapist, desecrator, beast, reptile, insect, germ, 
or devil”(Alexander, Brewer, & Herrmann, 1999).  
 Delegitmization is a result of minimal contact between the two groups and plays a 
major role in the conflict. Delegitimization explains the nature of the conflict and how its 
conception was the fault of the enemy(Bar-Tal,, 1990), justifies violence on the 
opponent(Tajfel, 1981), creates distance and superiority (Taijfel, 1981), mobilizes group 
members to avenge acts by enemy and prevent future ones. 
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Self-Victimhood. Groups in intractable conflicts consider themselves to be the 
sole victims of the ongoing struggle. Self-victimhood is important in intractable conflicts 
because it prevents people from seeing the rival group’s perspective and accepting 
responsibility for one’s own group actions. Self-victimhood stems from having suffered 
violence, positive collective self-image, emphasizing the wickedness of the opponent’s 
goals, delegitimizing opponent’s characteristics (Frank, 1967). The roots of self-
victimhood can also have roots in the distant past; a prominent example Bar-Tal uses is 
the history of Jewish persecution culminating in the Holocaust as providing a basis for 
modern Israeli self-victimhood.  
 In addition to a presentation of self-victimhood to one’s own group, be it 
psychologically or through physical events like memorials, self-victimhood is important 
to project to the international community. Groups that are viewed as the victim by an 
international third party are viewed with more empathy and support, not blamed for 
continuation of the conflict, and are more likely to receive worldwide backing in the 
forms of political, moral, and material support.  
 
Positive self-image. A crucial part of the ethos of conflict is setting up an “Us” 
versus “Them” construct and maintaining a strong and vocal duality between the in-group 
and the opponent. A vital part of this duality is the positive self-image groups adopt to set 
up against the delegitimized  negativity of the opponent. A positive collective self-image 
can encompass positive traits, values, and skills that not only characterize the society but 
also the group’s actions and contribution to greater civilization (Hirshberg, 1993). This 
image is present in times of peace; however, a group’s belief about their inherently 
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supeior positive traits become more important during times of intractable conflict. Groups 
need to more strongly adhere to their positive self-image and social identity in order to 
maintain it during the logistical, violent, and sometimes inhumane requirements of 
intractable. 
 During intractable conflicts, there are several prominent propagated 
characteristics separated into two groups 1. Humanness, civility, morality, fairness, and 
trustworthiness 2. Competence, courage, heroism, and endurance. These groupings of 
characteristics are intended to create contrasts between the in-group that embodies those 
positive virtues and the out-group that is devoid of them. The first group is to create a 
distinctive and recognizable difference to the “Us” versus “Them” (Stagner, 1967). These 
characteristics allow the in-group to see themselves in a positive humane light that 
denotes how their identity withstands the conflict. The second group pertains to the 
positive self-image in regards to the violent aspect of the conflict. These characteristics 
inform how the in-group perceives itself in regards to the military and violent actions 
taken during the conflict.  
 
Security. Security is one of the foremost elements of the ethos of conflict. 
Intractable conflicts are armed conflicts that take place over a long time; violence is 
perpetual and is often directed at both military and civilian populations. Abraham 
Maslow, most known for his work on the hierarchy of needs, emphasizes the need for 
human’s physical and mental security (Maslow, 1970). Due to human necessity for 
security and its prominence in armed conflicts, security is often one of the most 
prominent and visible elements in culture and policy. Ruling parties, be it governments or 
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informal groups, involved in armed conflicts are obligated to guarantee the security of 
their constituents. Institutions and industries that create the means to create security 
become the fulfillment of this promise.  
 Security, the necessity for it and its implementation, is used as justification for 
governmental decisions, formal legislation, and educational or cultural programming. It 
can also be used as an excuse to undermine formal government or military protocol and 
to facilitate or justify illegal or immoral actions. Most importantly, perceived or 
materialized threats to security are used to mobilize support (political, financial, military 
etc.) for the conflict. Many groups in intractable conflicts develop “securatism” where 
security becomes the driving factor of policies and decisions in many areas of societal 
life. Once societies have made this switch, security becomes the most central issue of the 
conflict and has determinative power in the direction of policy and cultural attitude (Bar-
Tal, Magal, & Halperin, E. 2009) (Don-Yehiya, Liebman, 1983). 
 
Patriotism. In terms of the ethos of conflict, patriotism focuses on the bond 
between society members and the collective whole that is essential for willing 
participation and support of the conflict. Even in times of peace, patriotism is found in 
ethnic groups and nations because it implies an attachment between group members and 
the society. These feelings of attachments are accompanied with sentiments such as a 
sense of belonging, affection, and concern (Bar-Gal, 1993). 
In his book, Bar-Tal refers to three kinds of patriotism that develop in intractable 
conflicts. The first is conventional patriotism. Conventional patriotism simply denotes the 
attachment individuals form to their collective group and society as a whole. 
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Conventional patriotism is always present both in times of peace and in times of conflict. 
The second type of patriotism, blind patriotism, is seen more in times of conflict than in 
times of peace. Blind patriotism is a rigid and inflexible attachment through total 
identification with the group; it reflects total acceptance of group goals, ideologies, 
policies, norms, practices, and formal leadership without entertaining criticism of 
possible failings. Bind patriotism does not tolerate dissenters and dismisses reflective 
thinking that might find fault in the group. The last type of patriotism is constructive 
patriotism. Constructive patriotism is seen less during times of conflict because it denotes 
an attachment to the group that, with care, criticizes group ideologies or tendencies and 
expresses concern when the group acts immorally.  
 Patriotism is of major importance during conflicts because people will need to 
feel attachment and support for their group to justify the heavy costs in terms of human 
and material resources (Bar-Tal, 2003). During times of conflict, people will have to give 
up personal comforts, desires, basic human needs, and their very lives in order to help 
achieve societal goals (Somerville, 1981).  Society members who do not adhere to group 
goals or further narratives different from the ones perpetuated by the ruling authorities 
are considered nonpatriots and are scorned. Therefore in many instances those who call 
for peace are considered disloyal and can face social or political consequences.  
 
Unity. The concept of unity is closely related to patriotism in that it binds the 
affective commitment individuals feel towards the society and binds them into a cohesive 
whole. Groups act to keep the core consistent and harmonious so that it can better deal 
with the external threat; unity is stressed because internal conflicts can harm the common 
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cause (Doise & Moscovici, 1994). A lack of unity leads to internal schisms and 
polarizations that distract society from its main purpose of confronting the enemy. In 
order to promote unity, controlling parties try to create the sense that everyone in society 
supports the conflict goals. This can be done through implementation of mass media, 
education, public ceremonies, and other highly visible means so that individuals can see 
that “everyone’s” attitudes and dispositions are congruent with the pursuit of group goals. 
It is important to note that unity is threatened when a fragment of the society realizes 
there may be a potential for a peace process. This fragment subsequently begins to 
change their own goals contrary to the rest of society; this switch is also accompanied 
with changing views and a humanization of the opponent. The controlling parties who 
seek to maintain unity in pursuance of originally stated conflict goals usually harshly 
sanction this process.  
 
Peace. Peace is not a very present or visible element of the ethos of conflict; 
confounding factors detrimental to the idea of peace, such as delegitimization of the 
opponent and justness of one’s own goals, imply that the idea of peace (inherently some 
kind of compromise) is not attainable given the elements on the ground. However, 
although it is not present most of the time people need to believe in a light at the end of 
the tunnel. When individuals stuck in intractable conflicts consider peace, they do not 
necessarily consider the concrete steps that would materialize it but rather an atmosphere 
and utopia that follow the realization of group goals.  
 Even though peace is not often earnestly sought throughout intractable conflict 
groups may feign commitment to the idea to placate or elicit support from the 
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international community. When a group loudly and repeatedly claims to want “peace,” 
especially in forms of mass media or in international groups such as the United Nations, 
it presents itself as the more level-headed, reasonable group that would gladly lay down 
their arms if only their opponent was not so bloodthirsty or stubborn. Even while the 
reality of attaining peace fluctuates between levels of attainability groups frequently 
express their desire for it to warrant sympathy from the international community that may 
or may not be motivated to intervene on their behalf.  
 
Aims for This Paper 
In Bar-Tal’s exposition of the ethos of conflict, one thing missing is a discussion 
on how power dynamics influence the prioritization of the elements of the ethos of 
conflict for each side. Although prioritization is influenced by respective national and 
ethnic identities, group history, and goals, power influences group circumstances and 
contribute to how much emphasis each element receives. A powerless party in intractable 
conflict that faces physical and legislative persecution may experience greater societal 
feelings of self-victimhood and security. Conversely, those groups in positions of power 
may experience collective emphasis of positive self-image because their position of 
authority and privilege allows them to consider themselves in an even more positive light.  
The ethos of conflict is a comprehensive description of the societal attitudes and 
psychological tendencies of groups locked in intractable conflicts; however, the makeup 
of those attitudes and tendencies are subject to the fluidity of different factors. Power 
dynamics can change in an ongoing conflict and, along with other circumstantial factors, 
influence how much weight different elements receive in the ethos of conflict.  
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 Using Bar-Tal’s conception of intractable conflict as a benchmark, I first seek to 
provide an understanding of the ethos of conflict at the beginning the conflict. To do this, 
I provide a foundation of each of the elements of the ethos of conflict from the start of 
Zionism through the United Nations Partition of 1947. In relation to the ethos of conflict, 
this period is important because it sets the stage for the juxtaposition of group goals 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians before the groups enter into the armed conflicts 
that will truly frame both sides in intractable conflict. This period tells the story of how 
two conflicting identities of nationalism formulated from ingredients that had either never 
been focused into a consolidated identity or had not in thousands of years. During this 
time we see the formation of the opposing groups in terms of individual and societal 
attitudes, infrastructure, and the driving psychological forces that would shape the goals 
of each group.  
 At this stage in the conflict, the Zionists and the Palestinians held roughly equal 
amounts of power. Beleaguered by centuries of persecution in Europe and new to a 
foreign land, the steady stream of Zionists were still able to secure a presence for 
themselves in their ancestral homeland due to superior agricultural techniques and 
influxes of capital from Europe. On the other hand, the Palestinians far outnumbered the 
Zionists and proved to be a consistent physical threat to them over the course of the 
period. Throughout the time of the Ottoman Empire through the British Mandate, both 
parties enjoyed the support of international third parties and both felt damage from their 
change in favor. Both groups held equitable amounts of power, which allowed their 
respective ethos of conflict to manifest in a similar way.  
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 The Israelis and the Palestinians, at the beginning of the conflict, have different 
yet balanced power in terms of resources, international support, and physical numbers. 
The revival of Israeli identity becomes equally matched with the birth of Palestinian 
Nationalism. Although both groups stem from distinct national heritages, cultures, and 
histories, the equity in their power and the rise of their respective nationalisms along the 
same chronological timeline allows each group to organically place similar weight on 
each element of conflict.  
 The current period, however, does not share the same equitable distribution of 
power between both groups. I will define the current period as from 2005, the end of the 
Second Intifada, through the current day. This time period is important to the ethos of 
conflict for several ways. Firstly, it represents the stalemate that has come to characterize 
the conflict with both sides reiterating actions and goals without much of an initiative to 
move towards peace. The groups have been framed in intractable conflict that has 
changed from large-scale military clashes to smaller conflicts between militaries with 
non-state actors. These new kind of altercations along with the rhetorical and cultural 
clashes between both groups have developed into a rhythm. Secondly, it portrays how 
each group’s ethos of conflict has evolved in relation to the drastic imbalance in power 
between the Israelis and the Palestinians. 
The Israelis enjoy relative economic prosperity and have a far superior political 
infrastructure and military capacity. The Palestinians are disjointed in leadership, have a 
lower standard of living due to economic sanctions and corruption in the government, and 
have no standing army and must rely on foreign sources for the arms they fight with. Day 
to day interactions between Israelis and Palestinians emblem a clear power dynamic and 
THE INFLUENCE OF POWER DYNAMICS  18       
usually involve an Israeli in a position of power (usually a soldier) interacting with an 
average Palestinian civilian. In terms of groups, the Israelis are unanimously seen as 
having the upper hand and the Palestinians seen as being powerless. The ongoing conflict 
is monitored by the international community and reaffirms the perception of the power 
disparity between the two groups. 
 In this paper I will first examine the foundation of each group’s ethos of conflict 
from the start of Zionism through the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 and see how 
the change in power dynamics has affected the ethos of conflict in the modern period. I 
will argue that Israel’s rise in power has influenced them to place more emphasis on 
security, self-victimhood, and positive self-image while the Palestinians’ powerlessness 
has promoted an ethos of conflict centered on self-victimhood, justness of their own 
goals, and delegitmization of the Israelis.  
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Start of Zionism – the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947 
Although formal armed struggles did not begin for many years, the first stirrings 
of the conflict are widely considered to have begun in the late 19th century with the start 
of Zionism. Zionism, the nationalist and political movement of Jews that first sought to 
create a Jewish cultural center and later a state in the land of Palestine, first began in the 
1860’s. Millennia of Jewish persecution and uncertain status within the states of Europe 
prompted Jews to try to answer Europe’s "Jewish question” for themselves. The Jewish 
Question, a term made popular by German historian Bruno Bauer in his book The Jewish 
Question, became the name of the debate on how Europe should accord rights and 
treatment to their resident Jews (Parkes, 1941). Before Zionism, answers to the Jewish 
Question ranged from segregation and separate rights, attempts at coerced and forced 
assimilation, deportation, and death.  
The Age of Enlightenment of the mid 18th century brought a suppression of 
religion and a greater importance on logic and science. The Enlightenment saw the 
transition from classical Christian anti-Semitism held by religious fanatics, beginning in 
the 4th century, to a race-centered hate held by prominent intellectuals. Christian anti-
Semitism’s classic claims followed the narrative that Jews killed Jesus and participated in 
blood libel, to racial anti-Semitism which claimed that the evil and malicious Jewish 
traits were based on ethnicity rather than belief. The distinction between the two hatreds 
is that in times of Christian anti-Semitism a Jew could rid himself of scorn and 
persecution simply by rejecting his Jewish faith. Indeed, in medieval anti-Semitism it was 
widely believed that a baptism would rid a Jew of demon-like physical features such as a 
tail and horrible stench. In the times of racial anti-Semitism, however, even the most 
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assimilated Jews who were now devout Christians could not escape persecution because, 
although they had shaken off their faith, their destructive traits were passed down to them 
by blood and no behavior or belief modification could change that. In tandem with 
theories of racial anti-Semitism was Social Darwinism that emphasized conflict and 
hierarchy between races of human beings. In this theory, European Aryans were placed 
higher than Semitic Jews. This would prove problematic for Jews who had embraced the 
concept of Haskalah: a movement that advocated making religious and cultural sacrifices 
in order to better integrate and assimilate among the gentile societies they found 
themselves in. Many Jews in Enlightenment-era Europe were tired of the constant 
persecution and degradation that had been characteristic of Jewish existence since the 
beginning of Christian anti-Semitism. They were ready and willing to make concessions 
in terms of language and observation of halachic law in order to better their lot in 
contemporary society.  
Although willing to make cultural and religious concessions, Jews still found 
widespread persecution across Europe. They were viewed as an alien, insidious group of 
people intent on harming their host country. Often, even though they had been semi-
integrated in terms of lacking overly-distinctive practices or dress, Jews experienced 
communal violence against them in the form of the German Hep-Hep Riots (1819) and 
the Odessa Pogroms (1821, 1859, 1871, 1881, 1886). After years of failed assimilation 
beginning with the start of the Haskalah movement in the 1770’s, Jewish philosopher and 
socialist Moses Hess was the first person to offer Zionism as the answer to the Jewish 
Question in his book Rome and Jerusalem (Hess, Boyer-Mathia, & Boyer, 1958). In this 
book he claims that Jews will always be strangers to European people and they will never 
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be accepted. He claims that the Jewish “type” is indestructible and will therefore be 
immune to assimilation and the only solution available to them is to return to their 
homeland. 
Leon Pinsker, an original advocate of assimilation, changed his mind after the 
1871 Odessa pogrom in Russia and began to believe that the only answer to the Jewish 
question was Zionism. After another pogrom in 1882, he wrote the pamphlet Auto-
Emancipation in which he wrote that Jews’ perpetual alien status would never allowed 
them to be accepted in Europe, “Since the Jew is nowhere at home, nowhere regarded as 
a native, he remains an alien everywhere. That he himself and his ancestors as well are 
born in the country does not alter this fact in the least” (Pinsker & Neher, 1944). 
Responding to the persecution of emancipated Jews, wealthy Jewish philanthropists such 
as the Montefiore and Rothschild families sponsored what was known as the “First 
Aliyah” in 1882 (Scharfstein, 1997). Aliyah, the Hebrew word for ascent, is used to refer 
to Jews who migrate to the Land of Israel.  
The first pioneers had already left Europe for the shores of Palestine. However, 
Zionism did not become a formal movement until after Theodor Herzl witnessed the 
Dreyfus Affair in France in 1984. The Dreyfus Affair, in which Jewish French captain 
Alfred Dreyfus was wrongly accused and convicted of treason for giving secret 
documents to the German military. The trial and the public ceremony that followed 
shocked Herzl. At the ceremony Dreyfus had his medals stripped, sword broken, and was 
paraded before a mob of Parisians who chanted, “Kill the Jews!” In his pamphlet, The 
Jewish State (1896), Herzl said that the only way to avoid European anti-Semitism was to 
create a sovereign Jewish state (Smith, 2004). He established the World Zionist Congress 
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(1897) with the original intention of establishing a home for the Jewish people in 
Palestine. After this, there was steady Jewish immigration to Palestine punctuated by 
large waves of Aliyah following acute events such as pogroms in Russia in 1905 and 
flight from anti-Semitic regimes in Poland and Hungry between 1924-1929. 
However, as Zionism progressed and Jews made aliyah from Europe to Palestine, 
there began to be friction between these new immigrants and the Arabs already living 
there. In 1890, there were 489,000 Arabs compared to 43,000 Jews (DellaPergola, 2001). 
The Arabs of Palestine experienced the early signs of the coming nationalist movement in 
the 1834 revolt against Egyptian conscription. Muhammed Ali, a rebel ruler who had 
been ruling since he had ousted Napoleon’s forces from Egypt, had demanded conscripts 
but many Palestinians across all castes of society rebuffed the demand in knowledge that 
conscription was most likely to lead to death. The revolt was brutally suppressed but is 
considered by some to be the first formative period of Palestinian nationalism 
(Kimmerling & Migdal, 2003). The return of Ottoman rule in 1840 brought with it a 
series of reforms know as the Tanzimat. Although the reforms had a wide effect on 
different aspects of life under Ottoman rule, none was so systemically transformative as 
the Ottoman Land Code of 1858 that brought with it the Tapu resmi.  
The Tapu was a land deed that required people to formally register their farmland 
with the government. This was a critical divergence from the traditional perception of 
ownership by cultivation. In previous times the societal norm was a family declared 
ownership of the land by working it, not through formal agreements. The mukhtars of 
Palestinian villages were the only ones who were literate which allowed them to register 
village lands, farmed by others, under their own name, effectively turning farmers into 
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proprietors rather than owners of their land. The Tapu is of crucial importance because it 
later allowed the mukhtars to claim ownership of peasant land and sell it to Jewish 
immigrants (Shafir, 1996). Palestinian life was largely centered around agriculture and 
the increase in Jewish land ownership threatened that culture. Although Palestinian 
nationalism was still a vague movement without distinct direction or leadership, the 
influx of Jewish immigrants and their rapid purchasing of land posed an economic threat 
to Palestinian peasant farmers that would help bind them together in the coming years of 
the conflict.  
Zionism, particularly its effect on the region’s land ownership, in tandem with the 
growing discontent with foreign rule (first with the Ottomans from 1840 until 1918 and 
later the British during the mandate period from 1920-1948), fueled the rising desire for 
self-determination. Small clashes developed from the start of Zionism but then got 
markedly worse as time went on. Before 1917, the Arabs living in Palestine viewed 
Zionism as a presence that was barely tolerable but authorized by the Sultan. While the 
Arabs living in Palestine did consider themselves subjects of the Ottoman Empire, they 
were undergoing a surge of nationalism that had begun during the Revolt of 1834 against 
Egyptian Conscription. The Arabs in Palestine had remained part of a Pan-Arab national 
movement that emphasized the solidarity and uniqueness of the Arab people, a people 
that had been chaffing against Ottoman rule. In the Hussein-McMahon correspondence 
(1915-1916), a series of letters between Great Britain and the Sharif of Mecca, the United 
Kingdom promised support for Arab independence if they rebelled against the Ottomans.  
The Arabs rose up to cast off the Ottomans in 1916 but Great Britain reneged on 
their promises during their secret Sykes-Picot negotiations they held with France. 
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Between 1915 and 1916 Great Britain and France had held secret negotiations regarding 
the international control of the Middle East following World War One. After the collapse 
of the Ottoman Empire the Sykes-Picot Agreement allocated the Palestinian territory to 
the British Empire rather that allowing it to join Syria as the Palestinians had hoped. 
Further complicating the issue, Great Britain had issued the Balfour Declaration in 1926 
that advocated for a Jewish national home (and the subsequent increased immigration) in 
Palestine as well as requiring Hebrew to become an equal-status to Arabic in official 
proclamations and permitting Zionists to fly their flag (Smith, 2004). The Balfour 
Declaration would become the enemy that united the Palestinian people as it embodied 
the economic and demographic threat of Zionism.  
Palestinian nationalism only intensified during the period of the British Mandate 
(1920-1948). Chaim Weizmann, a Zionist representative, met with Emir Faisal, a 
Hashemite Prince, in 1919 (in which would become the Faisal-Weizman agreement) to 
broker a Jewish settlement in Palestine alongside the Arab kingdom Faisal desired. Faisal 
gave his support for the Balfour Declaration, which seemed like a compromise in 
interests for the Palestinian Arabs. The Palestinians had just held their first Palestinian 
National Congress (1919) in Jersualem where they explicitly rejected the Balfour 
Declaration. This led Palestinians away from Syrian-Arab-Nationalism that was led by 
Faisal and refocused them on achieving a separate state with an Arab majority. The 
Faisal-Weizman agreement led to the first formative period of Palestinian Nationalism; 
the Palestinians could no longer depend on Prince Faisal and the hope of becoming 
“Southern Syria.” in the Third Arab Congress held in 1920 Musa Kazim al-Husseini, the 
elected chairman of the executive committee stated, “Now, after the recent events in 
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Damascus, we have to effect a complete change in our plans here. Southern Syria no 
longer exists. We must defend Palestine” (Kimmerling, 2009). This event forced the 
Palestinians to reconsider their expression of identity in an individual, nationalist context.  
   Between 1919 and 1926 there was a marked increase in Jewish immigration to 
Palestine. Anti-Semitic occurrences, notably the Kiev Pogroms in the Ukraine (1919) 
during which 100,000 Jews were killed, led to an increase of 90,000 immigrants to 
Palestine (Berry & Philo, 2006). In 1922 there were 668,000 Arabs in comparison with 
the 84,000 Jews (Dellapergola, 2001). This Western-endorsed mass wave of immigrants 
was the first critical point in creating the intractable conflict we see today; Palestinian 
Arabs viewed Zionism as a threat to their national identity and relations and grew hostile 
as a result. The Nebi-Musa riot in 1920 and the Jaffa riots of 1921 (in which Arabs 
attacked Jews) marked the first large-scale violent conflicts of many soon to follow. In 
the investigative commission established by Thomas Haycraft, the acting Chief Justice of 
the Supreme Court of Palestine, following the Jaffa riot he concluded that the 
fundamental cause of the riot was political and economic discontentments related to 
Jewish Immigration (Tessler, 1994). The Jaffa riots resulted in formation of the Haganah: 
a Jewish defense organization founded to protect Jewish life and property. It is important 
to note that Jewish leaders felt as if it was necessary to form their own defense league 
because they could not rely on British police to stop the Arabs.  
The formation of the Haganah led to more frequent direct confrontations between 
Jews and Arabs. The 1929 Palestine riots saw Jews massacred in Hebron as a result of 
tensions in the Old City of Jerusalem. Along with the violent struggles instigated on the 
Jewish Zionists, Palestinians also created militant groups such as the Black Hand to fight 
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against the British. From the Palestinian perspective, the most important event of the 
British Mandate period was the Arab Revolt of 1936-1939. Palestinians waged an 
uprising against the British in a bid for independence and to combat Zionist immigration. 
Economic hardships following World War One and increased Zionist land ownership 
fueled the growing nationalism that had been building in Palestine.  
The 1937 the British Peel Commission was the first to propose a division of the 
land into an Arab and a Jewish state. The Zionist Congress originally accepted it so that it 
could be negotiated further; the Palestinians, on the other hand, rejected it outright.  
Balfour Declaration swelled the Jewish population, but the Arabs in Palestine still 
outnumbered them by more than a 2:1 ratio (Dellapergola, 2001). On the brink of World 
War Two, Great Britain decided to switch tactics in Palestine in order to recruit more 
Arab support in the fight against Fascism. The 1939 MacDonald White Paper, 
administered by the British, severely constricted Jewish immigration to Palestine on the 
grounds that it had fulfilled its mandate of creating a Jewish homeland and that further 
immigration would be detrimental to the Arab population in Palestine. Relations between 
the Jews and the Palestinians did not change much during World War Two and tensions 
remained at a stable, but hostile, level.  
After World War Two ended, the Jewish Resistance movement ceased its 
terroristic operations against British Forces that began with the White Paper and focused 
instead on illegal immigration of Jews from Europe. Support for Zionism grew and 
undertook a hysterical importance, as details of the Holocaust became more widely 
known. In 1947 the United Nations formed the United Nations Special Committee on 
Palestine that put forth another partition plan. Like the Peel Commission, it was widely 
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accepted by the Jews and wholeheartedly rejected by the Arabs. Arabs argued that it was 
unfair to the Arab majority in Palestine but most importantly unanimously opposed the 
formation of a Jewish state in Palestine at all. The committee adopted the resolution on 
November 29, 1947 and the first formal armed conflict between the Israelis and Arabs 
started the same day.  
 
Ethos of Conflict 
In this period, both groups had similar prioritizations of their ethos of conflict that 
reflected the equitable power distributions between the two groups. In this chapter, I will 
present each group’s ethos of conflict as it developed from the start of Zionism through 
the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947. However, I will be presenting them in a 
structure specific to the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict. For this conflict, specific to this time 
period, the ethos of conflict can be broken into three sections. The first section, including 
justness of goals, self-victimhood, positive self-image/delegitimization of the opponent, 
contains in-group facets of the ethos of conflict. The second group, what contains what I 
will call the out-group facets, consists of patriotism and unity and is reflective of how 
groups’ internal identities interact with outside forces. Both the first and second groups, 
however, are influenced by the element of security that colors all of the elements within. 
Lastly, the element of peace has its own group as this period defines the beginning of the 
conflict and peace is not earnestly pursued.  
In the section that follows, I will provide an analysis of the first two groupings of 
the Israeli ethos of conflict.  
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Israel In-group  
Justness of Goals. Zionism, Jewish nationalism, is tied to the age-old yearning 
for Zion, which Sami Adwan (2012) defines as “an inseparable part of the religious and 
national identity of the Jewish people throughout history” The grief at being expelled 
from their homeland in 70 CE is summarized in Psalm 137, which depicts the Jewish 
people beside the rivers of Babylon after the Babylonian conquest of Israel. At the time 
of their expulsion the Jewish people pledge they will never stop longing for Zion; for it is 
so central that their identity that if they forget it they will not be able to do anything else. 
“Jerusalem if I forget thee let my right hand forget its cunning” (Rendsberg & Rendsberg 
, 1993). Jews, throughout their literature and culture, have always referenced the return to 
Israel as an overarching goal of their culture and religion. Every year during the Passover 
Sedar it is customary to say “Next year in Jerusalem,” in hope that when the family next 
sits down for a Sedar it might be in the redeemed land of Israel. 
The emergence and justification for Zionism was primarily in response to the 
emergence of racial anti-Semitism. It became clear that once anti-Semitism evolved into 
considering Jews an alien race rather than simply demons who killed Christ that they 
would not be welcomed in any societies. For even if Jews changed their beliefs, their 
heritage would not permit them to live a safe life in the Gentile communities they had 
come to settle in. The failure of the Haskalah movement informed Zionism’s goals in 
several ways. First, it allowed them to realize that they needed a home and later state of 
their own which they decided should be located in their ancestral homeland. Secondly, 
and more importantly, it convinced Jews that there needed to be a Jewish majority in that 
state. If history had convinced Jews of anything, it was that they were not safe as a 
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perpetual minority within countries they inhabited. This mindset allowed Jews to justify 
the displacement of Arabs who had been living within the Palestine in order to create a 
Jewish majority.  
Another goal of the Jewish immigrants was the desire to finally have a place of 
physical security. Violence against Jewish immigrants emphasized the justness and 
necessity of a place where Jews can be safe and mobilized them to secure that goal. From 
the period of the riots of the early 1920’s until 1929, the Haganah was primarily 
established to protect farmland and kibbutzim. However, the riots of 1929 dramatically 
changed the role and attitude of Jewish defense. In reaction, the Haganah expanded to 
include the majority of people in the Jewish settlements. The growing reality of a 
Palestinian National movement made an imminent armed struggle much more likely; 
Chaim Arlosoroff, the director of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, declared 
that Zionism would have to use force to achieve its aims (Shapira, 1992).  
The massacres that took place in Hebron and Safed, in addition to a growing 
appreciation for a legitimate oppositional national force, facilitated a rift in the Haganah 
that birthed the Irgun Bet (“Second National Military Organization). The Irgun Bet was 
formed because they did not believe that the simply tactic of defense performed the 
Haganah was adequate in defending the Yishuv. Irgun Bet policy sprung from the 
teachings of Jabotinsky in that they believed in the necessity of active retaliation and an 
armed Jewish force in order to repel the Arabs and secure a Jewish state (Sachar, 2013). 
The Irgun Bet adopted a policy of “active defense,” a term coined by David Raziel’s 
article in the underground newspaper By The Swor (Grunor, 2005). The logic was that in 
order to defeat an enemy one must break their will and their spirit to fight; defensive 
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action alone will never succeed in this. Thus after the 1929 massacres, a fragment of 
Jewish security switched from defense, to retaliatory strikes, to eventually preemptive 
attacks in order to discourage Arab violence on Jews.  
Justness of Jewish goals contributed to the ethos of conflict in that, once the 
Jewish immigrants had decided that they needed a state of their own where they could be 
safe, it set the stage for conflict with the Palestinians. The Jewish-majority state that 
Zionists ended up envisioning for themselves sharply contrasted the growing nationalism 
of the Palestinians that also would desire statehood built on the same land.   
Positive Self-Image and Delegitimization of Opponent. Jewish positive self-
image was steady throughout the period and served as a basis for Zionist policies of 
separation. It was also constructed via the juxtaposition of Jewish and Arab culture Jews 
frequently described themselves as superior or as the embodiment of progressive cultures 
in relation to the backwards Arabs. In his letter to Henrietta Szold, Avlashom Feinberg 
described Jewish settlements as a bastion between “culture and savagery” where Jewish 
achievements could only be protected through barbed wire (Gorni, 1987). In an article 
published in Ha-Olam, Moshe Smilansky expressed his desire to make sure resources 
would benefit the Jews alone because it would prevent the corruption of the Yishuv’s 
good qualities and debasement of its moral standards (Gorni, 1987). 
Jews saw themselves as the embodiment of progress and the bearers of Western 
values, along with being the chosen people, in opposed to the socially primitive and 
oriental thinking of the Arabs. Jews considered the Arabs as embodying Eastern culture 
which they characterized as, “submission to oppression against love of liberty; and social 
oppression and discrimination against women as compared to the Western love of 
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equality and justice.” Whereas Jews, although being a Semitic people themselves and 
originating in the East, identified with the spiritual and ideological principles of the West 
(Gorni, 1987). Ze’ev Jabotinsky also professed nobility of race which claimed that racial 
superiority did not give people the right to rule others but was, “proof of the power to 
survive while preserving and fostering racial, national, and communal singularity” 
(Gorni, 1987). He claimed that the Jewish people had exceptionally kept its national 
character despite of the thousands of years of persecution and trials they had faced. 
The positive self-image of the Jews was also reflected from their active 
participation in the realization of their dream of Zion. The Yishuv believed that they were 
both pioneers, warriors, and active participants in the completion of a struggle dating 
back more than a thousand years. During the 1947 United Nations Partion Plan meetings, 
Ben-Gurion stated, “I know of no greater achievement by the Jewish people … in its long 
history since it became a people” (Gorni, 1987). Indeed, the positive self-image was also 
reflected in the fighters of the Yishuv as seen in the case of Joseph Trumpeldor. 
Trumpeldor, who died in a confrontation at Tel Hai in 1920, said, “Never mind, it is good 
to die for our country” (Gorni, 1987). A roaring lion statue was erected at the site of the 
battle and the phrase became a cornerstone in Zionist mythology.  
One of the ways in which the separationist movement justified their policies and 
goals towards a Jewish majority in Palestine was by delegitimizing the Arabs and 
claiming that their barbaric nature was either infectious or dangerous. The olim viewed 
the Arabs as “primitive, dishonest, fatalistic, lazy and savage” (Morris, 2011) In an article 
in Ha-Po’el ha Tza’ir, Moshe Smilansky called the Arabs base and ugly, saying, “Let us 
not be too familiar with the Arab fellahin les our children adopt their ways and learn from 
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their ugly deeds.” In a letter, Avlashom Feinberg, the child of Russian immigrants from 
the First Aliyah, stated: “I have lived among them all my life and it would be difficult to 
sway me from my opinion that there is no more cowardly, hypocritical, and false race 
than this one” (Florence, 2007).  
Following the violence in 1920 and 1921 in Jerusalem and Jaffa, there began to be 
a generally held belief that the Arabs were dangerous and uncivilized. This was not as 
formally espoused in the media until the 1929 riots and massacres following 
confrontations at the Western Wall that spread into Safed and Hebron. Following the 
massacres Arabs were described in Zionist puclications as “bandits, oriental savages, and 
murderers” (Morris, 2011). Jews began to think that Arabs were not only intent on 
stopping Zionism but destroying the Yishuv themselves.  
In addition to delegitimizing the Arabs character, the Zionists also sought to 
delegitimize and undermine the growing movement of Palestinian nationalism. During 
the Arab Revolt it became clear that Zionism faced an oppositional national movement 
rather than just a rabble of arabs chafing against their increasing presence. They called 
the anti-zionists outbreaks “pogroms” in order to link it to the mindless, hate violence 
that had occurred in Europe. This both decreased the importance of the movement itself 
while at the same time demonizing the Arabs to Jews in Palestine (Morris, 2011). When 
the Revolt was acknowledged at all it was likened to Nazism and called “immoral and 
terroristic” (Shapira, 1992). Yitzhak Tabenkin, an ideologue of the kibbutz movement 
said “The swastika, waved aloft in Hitler’s Germany, and the green flag, the Arab 
‘national’ flag, now upraised by the reactionary leadership of the Arabs of Palestine— 
they are the same flag, the flag of national hatred” (Shapira, 1992).  
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By delegitimizing the Arabs the Zionists were able to present their opponent as a 
primitive savage who was not interested in peace or decency in regards to their own 
positive self-image. Security concerns regarding the Arabs encouraged the Zionists to 
delegitimize them. That attitude contributed to the ethos of conflict in that they were able 
to say they had no one to make peace with and therefore pursue their own goals with no 
respect to the Arabs’ goals.  
Self-Victimhood. The Zionists security concerns regarding the Arabs only 
compounded the sense of self-victimhood that the Jewish immigrants already felt. Jewish 
self-victimhood had been culminating for thousands of years, particularly after the 
diaspora following the Roman conquest of Israel in 70 CE and the rising centrality of 
Christianity in European life. Anti-Semitism is sometimes described as the “world’s 
oldest hatred,” and Jewish persecution has been steady in its consistency and brutality. 
First reviled and feared for killing Christ, Jews were assigned demon-like characteristics 
and intentions that made them pariahs whom every manner of ill could be ascribed to. 
Then, after the rise of racial anti-Semitism, thought to be a malicious and destructive race 
seeking to leech off and undermine their host societies. A history of persecutions fueled a 
vibrant culture of self-victimhood in the olim who came to live in Palestine. This carried-
over attitude is concisely summarized by Yoseph Haim Brenner published in Revivim in 
1913, “We Jews are accustomed to being the weak among the strong, and we must 
therefore be ready for the consequences of the hatred nd must employ all the scant means 
at our disposal to survive here. After all, since we became a nation we have been 
accustomed to and are surrounded by hatred” (Frankel, 2009). This prevailing attitude of 
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self-victimhood influenced Zionist policies of separation and a cultural distrust of the 
Arabs 
The self-victimhood of the Jews in Palestine came to a head during World War 
two when details of the atrocities in the Holocaust became well known. The proportions 
of the calamity facing the Jewish people added a new, frantic energy to that of the Zionist 
movement. Benny Moriss (2011), in his book Righteous Victims: A History of the 
Zionist-Arab Conflict states that, “…the Zionists quest for statehood had quickened in the 
tragic circumstances of the Holocaust into a desperate resolve.” In addition, the 
Holocaust made an irrefutable case for the need for a Jewish state to the international 
community. Zionist’s attempts illegal-immigration following the MacDonald White 
Paper were proportionally futile; few Jews were saved from the camps and their numbers 
did not significantly bolster the Jews’ ranks in Palestine. However, the British efforts to 
block Jews fleeing the Holocaust were viewed as inhumane and in fact served to 
convince the world’s powers that Jews needed a sanctuary in that of an independent state. 
 In the manner of physical persecution throughout Jewish history and the 
Holocaust, security concerns helped shape the element of self-victimhood. Self-
victimhood contributed to the Zionist ethos of conflict by allowing the Zionists to neglect 
the Arabs’ legitimate grievances by focusing on the validity of their own.  
 
Israel Out-group  
Patriotism. Patriotism is one of the main contributors of the ethos of conflict. 
Zionism, the celebration of Jewish nationalism and its pursuit towards statehood, was 
vibrant during this period as Jews were rebuilding a scattered national identity. This 
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attitude of pride and national/ethnic solidarity contributes to the ethos of conflict in 
several ways. First, it creates a clear ethnic and national divide between the two groups 
that separates individuals into distinct and unbridgeable groups. Secondly, it assigns 
distinct and respective goals to those groups that often conflict with each other.  
 First there was Political Zionism: the belief that a homeland and statehood for the 
Jewish people would require first the public and legal support of foreign powers. Theodor 
Herzl endorsed this approach when he met with the Ottoman Sultan and offered to trade a 
consolidation of the Ottoman’s debt in return for facilitation of a Jewish homeland in 
Palestine. However, Political Zionism was more concerned with how to legally obtain a 
homeland in Palestine rather than the different expressions of nationalism. The two 
presiding expressions were Labor and Revisionist Zionism.  
Labor Zionism believed that the Jewish State would only come as a result of the 
Jewish people working the land of Israel and becoming a true nation through working the 
land. As stated in Moses Hess’ Rome and Jerusalem, he claims the Jewish people must 
return to the land of Israel in order to reclaim the productive, working class that they have 
been unable to enter since the diaspora. He proposed the formation of a socialist state 
where the “redemption of the soil” will allow the Jewish People into a proper nation 
(Hess, Boyer, & Boyer-Mathia, 1958). This mix of Socialism and Zionism produced the 
first kibbutzim. The kibbutzim were generally in outlying lands and focused on restoring 
the land through agriculture and the redemption of soil Hess proposed.  
Labor Zionists emphasized a romantic attachment to the land and a humble, 
enthusiastic service to Zion. They considered themselves pioneers and embraced the 
arduous labors that went into turning the harsh climate of Palestine into hospitable land 
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for a nation. This attitude is characterized in Nathan Alterman’s “Morning Song,” 
“Morning sun blazes on the mountains the valley wet with dew We love you, our 
homeland, in joy, in song and in work. Clothe you in concrete, cover you in gardens, the 
grains on your rescued lands will rejoice like bells” (Naveh, 2012). The manifestation of 
Labor Zionism was Hebrew Labor: a policy where Jews only hired other Jews for labor.  
Hebrew Labor had a direct and palpable contribution to the ethos of conflict by by 
creating an ethnic divide through policy that benefited the Jews at the exclusion of the 
Arabs.   
Revisionist Zionism was characterized by its ideology of territorial dominance 
over Eretz Yisrael (the ancient Land of Israel) and insisted Jews should have sovereignty 
over their entire ancestral homeland. These attitudes prompted them to policies of both 
separation and expansion and were more assertive and militant in their pursuit of the 
Jewish State. Revisionist fiercely advocated for military readiness and response to Arabs 
who had attacked Jews and were much more instrumental in the formation of the 
Haganah and later the Irgun. Revisionist Zionists emphasized immigration of Jews to 
Palestine and were very strategic in their interactions with the British during the mandate. 
As the ideological inheritors of Political Zionism, Revisionist leader Ze’ev Jabotinsky 
frequently sought to win British favor and convince them that larger portions of Jewish 
control was in their interest. Revisionist Zionism contributed to the ethos of conflict by 
establishing a military mindset and infrastructure that enforced a clear divide between 
Zionists and Arabs.  
Unity. Jews, ever a disjointed people, experienced elements and events that both 
added to and detracted from the presence of a unified front in face of conflict. There were 
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elements of Jewish unity that both contributed and detracted from the ethos of conflict. 
Booming construction in new settlements in addition to the revival of the Hebrew 
language as the main language spoken in schools as well as institutions contributed to the 
cohesiveness diaspora Jews felt as they settled in Palestine. The kibbutzim represented a 
new emergence of communal life where issues were handled democratically and 
collectively. Property belonged to the kibbutz itself and everyone was provided for 
according to their need. The natural unity felt in Jewish communities, borne from years of 
harsh conditions and oppression, flourished in the settlements and the kibbutzim. 
On the other hand, the Yishuv was quite split in regards to how to deal with both 
the Arabs and the security threats they felt from them. Jews in the earlier part of the 
period endorsed an “integrationist” approach that advocated for cooperation and 
interrelations with the Arabs. In “The Hidden Question,” Yitzhak Epstein claimed that 
Zionism depended on Arab consent and goodwill. The Arabs were a people with a 
profound emotional and cultural attachment to the land, “The Arab, like all other men, is 
attached to his homeland” (Shlaim, 2000). Those in the integrationist camp encouraged 
the idea that the Jews and the Arabs could coexist and reclaim their homeland at the same 
time. Some, such as Dr. Nissim Malul, suggested that the Jews learn Arabic and merge 
with the Arabs on the basis of joint Semitic nationalism (Gorni, 1987). 
Later, the increased hostility towards the Zionist movement the “separatist” 
outlook gained strength and eventually surpassed the integrationists as the predominant 
outlook. Those who ascribed to the separationist outlook asserted dominance over 
Palestine rather than simply equal national rights and looked down and despised Arabs. 
In tandem with a superior self-image and delegitimization of the Arabs, some of the 
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Yishuv, as seen in Moshe Smilansky’s article in in Ha-Po’el ha Tza’ir, believed that 
contact with base the Arabs would lead to an infection of the Yishuv’s moral fiber. 
Others, like Avlashom Feinberg juxtaposed Jewish and Israeli society and insisted that 
barbed wire was necessary to protect Jewish interests. In addition to their distaste for the 
Arab, those in the separatist camp viewed them as practical obstacles in their path to 
statehood. Joseph Klausner claimed that the whole goal of Zionism was to become 
“masters of the country” (Morris, 2011). Indeed many Revisionists did not want any kind 
of cooperation because they wanted to make sure any resources went exclusively to the 
Yishuv. 
Lastly, following the 1929 Riots that ended in massacres in Hebron and Safed, the 
Jewish community was in disagreement in how to handle the further issues of security. 
The disagreements and eventual falling out between the Haganah and the Irgun Bet 
would lead to vastly different perceptions of the Jewish military movement. The 
Haganah, resting on its policy of defence would cooperate with the British military 
during the time of the Arab Revolt and again during World War Two. The Irgun went on 
a campaign of “active defense” and would later commit acts widely regarded as terrorism 
against both the Arabs and the British. Following the 1944 assassination of Lord Moyne 
by the an offshoot of the Irgun the Haganah would cooperate with the British in the 
suppression of Irgun activities in an operation known as The Saison (“Hunting Season”).  
The Zionists’ unity was influenced by a variety of factors and had a mixed effect 
on the ethos of conflict. The integrationists, at first, had some influence and quelled the 
ethos of conflict by promoting cooperation with the Arabs. However, after the violence of 
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the 1920’s the separatists held sway and promoted an attitude of “otherness” and 
aggression that only stoked the ethos of conflict. 
 
Summary. In terms of an ethos of conflict, the Zionists developed their elements 
much quicker because they came to the conflict with a formed identity. This allowed 
them to quickly establish their goals and allowed other elements such as self-victimhood 
and positive self-image to formulate much faster because they had already clearly defined 
their in-group. The Palestinians, on the other hand, only were able to define their identity 
after a multitude of factors. The Palestinians did not have a firm identity to look positive 
on until the nationalist movement became a centralized in Palestine itself. In 1919 the 
First Palestine Arab Congress envisaged Palestine as part of a greater independent Syria. 
The British Mandate cut Palestine off from Syria; that, in addition to the unique pressures 
of Zionism helped form the first sense of a solitary Palestinian identity. In the scope of 
Arab nationalism, the Palestinians faced challenges that they did not share with any other 
nation. Therefore, once the growing nationalism that had been brewing since the revolt 
against Egyptian conscription in 1834 was isolated due to Western influence and unique 
challenges they had to shoulder alone, Palestinian nationalism was born in earnest.  
In the section that follows, I will provide a similar analysis for the first two 
groupings of elements of the ethos of conflict from the Palestinian side.  
 
Palestine In-group 
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Justness of Goals. The goals of the Palestinians and the justness attached to them 
were not quite as concrete as those of the Yishuv as their later formation of nationalism 
went through an evolution of its own goals. As far as Zionist goals were to be based in 
action Palestinian goals were based in reaction; the Yishuv pushed towards Zionism, the 
Palestinnians found themselves working towards their own nationalism through anti-
Zionism. In the beginning, Palestinian goals were less concrete and born out of reaction 
to the effects of Zionism and foreign rule. Those reactions and the subsequent goals of 
the Palestinians were reflective of the values inherent in Palestinian society. The 
Palestinians lived in a largely agricultural society; the increasing Jewish immigration and 
its effect on land labor and prices created economic and cultural despair that the 
Palestinians sought to correct through nationalism. This is reflective in that the fellahin 
were the first ones to clash with the Jewish immigrants after the Second Aliyah brought 
socialist-minded Jews intent on “conquering the soil”(Khalidi, 2010). The security threat 
the Palestinians felt, and how they influenced their justness of goals, were more related to 
how the Yishuv threatened their way of life than their physical safety. 
The fairly new concept of legal land ownership did not hold weight with the 
fellahin who believed that, although Jews legally bought the land they had worked, they 
still had inalienable right to their land. Furthermore, this new wave of Aliyah desired not 
only the ownership of the land but the cultivation of it; in addition to losing their 
livelihood this new ideology threatened the very connection the fellahin add with their 
land. The direct effects of Labor Zionism, which would become the predominant 
expression of Zionism in the Mandate period, were the displacement and 
disenfranchisement of the fellahin.  The families of fellahin had worked the same land for 
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generations and they to which they harbored great emotional attachment. In addition, 
because they put no stock in land by formal ownership, they believed they had an 
inalienable right to the land they cultivated. The displacement of fellahin was a threat to 
their very identity as well as their livelihoods. When they looked at Hebrew Labor they 
saw the subjugation of themselves under a people who had come to fill their roles and 
reap their benefits. This fear was formally addressed in the First Palestine Congress of 
1920, “How can we accept the life of slaves to the Jews and foreigners and not defend 
our political and natural rights? Raise your voice, protest this treachery” (Gelvin, 2013).  
The Palestinian elite was more concerned with the political aims of Zionism than 
its effect on the land. In his manuscript, Ruhi al-Khalidi warns about the Zionist’s 
intention to create a state in Palestine and used Jewish attempts to form symbols of 
statehood such as postal stamps and a flag as evidence (Muslih, 1988). The advent of 
Labor Zionism welded together the link between the Palestinian elite who opposed 
Zionism on principle and the fellahin who experienced the brunt of its effect on the land 
(Khalidi, 2010). The collective sense of deprivation, displacement, and helplessness gave 
substance to the goals of Palestinian nationalism. Palestinian nationalism defined its goals 
as maintaining its way of life, territory, and holy places from the invading Zionists. The 
Palestinians also considered their goals in terms of an all or nothing outcome; in 1919 the 
representatives of the Muslim-Christian Assocations told the committee of the King 
Crane Commission “We will push the Zionists into the sea-or they will send us back into 
the desert” (Morris, 2011).  
Many Palestinians also harbored beliefs that Zionism was simply another form 
foreign domination and western imperialism (Muslih, 1988). These feelings festered as 
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Zionism continued during the mandate under what Palestinians considered imbalanced 
policies that facilitated Jewish settlement. Once the Palestinians realized that they were 
their own entity, through a collection of factors including being cut off from Syria and the 
unique challenges of Zionism and the British, they began forming their own independent 
goals. The collective desires to be masters of their own fates allowed them to blend their 
goals of shirking off imperialistic British rule and ending Zionism into a unified directive 
as seen in the 1936 Arab Revolt, “Young nationalists now argued that British support of 
Zionism was not simply a delusion, to be corrected. Rather, Zionism was part and parcel 
of Western imperialism in the Middle East, and only the eradication of the latter could 
halt the advance of the former” (Kimmerling, 2009). 
The justness of Palestinian goals spring from the security threats to the way life 
had been before the presence of the Yishuv or the British. Past that, the goals sprung from 
threats they believed the Zionists and the British posed to the rising movement of 
Palestinian nationalism.  
Positive Self-Image and Delegitimization of Opponent. As Zionism increased 
and tensions grew between the Jewish immigrants and the Palestinians they began to 
assign Jews insidious and evil characteristics according to the role they perceived them to 
be playing. After it became clear that the Zionists were systematically purchasing land to 
displace fellahin and substitute tem with Hebrew labor the Palestinians began to think of 
the Zionists as an invading force. The Zionists were viewed as greedy colonizers who had 
no regard for the native people living there and sought to establish their own state on top 
of theirs. In the Nebi Mousa riots in 1920, Arabs celebrating the holiday were incited to 
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violence and chanted slogans such as, “Palestine is our land, the Jews are our dogs!” 
(Segev, 2001).  
In addition to conquerors of he land, the Jewish immigrants were seen as threats 
to the faiths of the Palestinians. In regards to the Christian-Palestinians, Jews were 
assigned their stereotypical roles assigned to them in traditional European anti-Semitism. 
These roles included Christ-killer and opponents to all things holy. In the demonstration 
before the Nebi Mousa riots, placards were held that read: “Shall we give back the 
country to a people who crucified our Lord Jesus?” (Morris, 2011). The Palestinian 
Muslims rejected the idea of Jews sharing their holy spaces, “the Jews— a dhimmi, 
inferior race— harboring, and attempting to further, political ambitions, and what’s more, 
on Muslim land” (Morris, 2011).  
It was generally believed that land conquered by Muslims became forever held by 
Islam; the presence of a small minority of Christians in their midst was not enough to 
draw ire from the Muslims but large-scale Jewish immigration did. Muslim sentiment of 
the Jews is captured in a poem by Sheikh Sulayman al-Taji, “Jews, sons of clinking gold, 
stop your deceit; We shall not be cheated into bartering away our country! … The Jews, 
the weakest of all peoples and the least of them, Are haggling with us for our land; How 
can we slumber on?” (Morris, 2011) These accusations were closely related to the anger 
and confusion brought on by the changes in land ownership policy. Still adhering to the 
concept of ownership by cultivation, Palestinians viewed Jews buying land as the literal 
embodiment of an unwanted change. They saw this happening in such large proportions 
and were thus able to assign Jews labels such as cheaters and deceivers as they robbed 
land from Palestinians. 
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In 1929, leaflets printed by the Husseini activists attempted to mobilize Muslims 
against Jews by claiming Jews had violated Islam by trying to claim the western wall, ” O 
Arab nation, the eyes of your brothers in Palestine are upon you…and they awaken your 
religious feelings and national zealotry to rise up against the enemy who violated the 
honor of Islam and raped the women and murdered widows and babies” (Morris, 2011 
Palestinian Muslims viewed the holy sites they shared with Jews as exclusively theirs and 
therefore considered any significant presence as encroachment on their holy territories 
and rights. The pamphlet used by Husseini activists utilized classic devices of 
delegitimization including the labeling the Jews as violators of the sacred goal of Islam as 
well as portraying them as a group that violates pivotal social norms. 
In regards to their positive self-image Palestinian identity came to define what it 
opposed: Zionism and the British Mandate. Palestinians viewed themselves as freedom 
fighters that defended the various parts of identity and culture under attack. These 
freedom fighters defended the individual elements of Palestinian society that made up the 
composite whole: the displaced and disadvantaged fellahin struggling as a result of 
Zionist immigration, the proud Muslim offended by the encroachment of Jews into the 
holy sites and towns, and the frustrated Arab rising up against imperial rule. In 1936, the 
leaders of the Arab Revolt issued a statement that read: “Palestine summons us to fight in 
the Path of God so that the world might bear witness to the unity of the nation.… We are 
called to battle for freedom, independence, and hope, and see the rebellion against 
oppression as a religious duty” (Nels, 1982). 
Izz ad-Din al-Qassam embodied the liberator of the fellahin and muslim 
community. Upon his return to Palestine he became infuriated at the plight of the fellahin. 
THE INFLUENCE OF POWER DYNAMICS  45       
He began preaching in Haifa and his sermon’s were rooted in Islam; he preached against 
the British and the Zionists whom he claimed Islam was ideologically and politically 
opposed to. Al-Qassam organized the Black Hand: a militant organization that conducted 
strikes against British and Zionist targets. In 1935, al-Qassam died in a shootout with 
British police but his death galvanized the Palestinian people and he became a symbol of 
the resistance. At his funeral, the euology praised him as Islam’s ideal soldier and 
challenged those to follow his footsteps, “Who would imitate Qassam as Islam’s ideal 
soldier, Follows, if he wishes release from his inherited humiliation” (Gelvin, 2013).1  He 
was praised as a martyr, which was the other side of the positive self-image coin to the 
freedom fighter. Martyrs, those who had died in service to the cause, were highly revered 
and respected in Palestinian society. This idealization of those who fell fighting was 
characterized in Mahmud Abd Al-Raheem’s poem Al-Shaheed (The Martyr): “Let it be a 
life which brings joy to the heart of friends, or a death which brings sorrow to the heart of 
foe! The spirit of a nobleman has but two aims: to die nobly or attain its aspirations” 
(Naveh, 2012). 
Palestinian positive self-image and their delegitimization of the Jews developed in 
tandem to the security threats they faced as a people. Palestinians viewed their physical 
land, livelihoods, religion, and way of life being threatened by the Zionists and later the 
British. This caused them to view and label them as invaders, desecrators of holy sites, 
and other malicious labels as they viewed them undermining the native Palestinian. Their 
positive self-image is rooted in their defiance to these threats; Palestinians considered 
themselves freedom fighters fighting against the dominating invading forces they were 
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confronted with. Delegitimization of the Jews and the positive self-image that 
accompanied it contributed to the ethos of conflict by defining what the enemy was and 
identified the heroism of the Palestinians who fought it. This further defined the in-group 
out-group of the conflict and assigned each side characteristics that would polarize the 
two groups.   
Self-Victimhood.  As opposed to the Jewish immigrants, who’s self-victimhood 
predated the current conflict by almost two thousand years, Palestinian self-victimhood 
was largely formed at the start of the conflict. The Tapu installed by the Ottoman Empire 
concentrated legal ownership of the hands of a few elites, many of who lived far away 
from the land they owned. Later these land owners would sell large swaths of the land 
they owned to Jewish immigration agencies the fellahin who believed they had an 
inalienable right to the land felt both culturally affronted and were displaced. Early on in 
the First Aliyah fellahin were usually allowed to remain employed under the new Jewish 
landowners in a plantation-like arrangement. However, after the onset of Labor Zionism 
and the emphasis on Hebrew Labor the fellahin both lost the land they still considered 
theirs and lost their livelihood. Territorial displacement was to be the biggest mobilizing 
factor in regards to Palestinian Nationalism and aggression towards the Jews (Morris, 
2011). Increased Jewish land ownership sent fellahin towards the fringes of big towns 
and put them in the lower rungs of socioeconomic society. Jewish land ownership 
financed by European capital and advanced farming methods rendered the remaining 
fellahin increasingly uncompetitive.  
In addition to the damages Jewish immigration and land ownership had on 
Palestinian pride and economy, Palestinians felt themselves at the mercy of two different 
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forces: the Zionism and the British. The Palestinians were almost immediately aware that 
the Zionists intended on displacing them and taking their homeland for themselves. As 
early as the First Aliyah a settler recorded observed that the animosity between the 
Jewish immigrants and the Palestinians, “The natives are hostile towards us, saying that 
we have come to drive them out of the country” (Morris, 2011). When these intentions 
were publicized and supported by the British in the Balfour Declaration the Palestinians 
now found themselves against the might of the Zionist movement and a world 
superpower. 
When it came to the British, the Palestinians considered them a Western influence 
that was controlled by international Jewry. The Palestinians suspected the British of 
attempting to create factions and discord within Palestinian leadership by installing 
oppositional political parties and tampering with elections (Naveh, 2012). Jewish 
immigration increased dramatically during the time of the British Mandate and further 
exacerbated fellahin landlessness and despair. Economic hardships were compounded by 
high taxes the mandatory government placed on Palestinian citizens. The final straw 
came when the British walked back on their promises to limit Jewish immigration in the 
Passfield White Paper. The MacDonald White Paper (to be known to Palestinians as the 
“Black Paper”) nullified the original document and reaffirmed the Mandate’s 
commitment to establishing a Jewish home in Palestine. The Black Paper cemented the 
idea that the British did not have the Palestinian’s best interests at heart.  
This self-victimhood stemming from security threats to Palestinian livelihood 
contributed to the ethos of conflict; the collective feelings of despair and victimhood 
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required an entity that the collective society could blame and hate for their suffering. In 
addition to the British, the Palestinians held the Yishuv responsible.  
 
Palestinian Out-group 
Patriotism. In Baruch Kimmerling and Joel Migdal’s book, Palestinian People: 
A History, they claim, “Palestinialism meant the assertion of Palestine as a common 
homeland at a time when political boundaries were new and still quite uncertain.” The 
idea of Palestinian nationalism first formed at the start of the British Mandate where it 
became clear that they would have to find another expression of identity that did not 
include Syria. At the end of April, 1920 Palestinian leadership began to accept to accept 
Palestine’s fate as separate and distinct (Morris, 2011). It budding sense of patriotism 
would grow until the Arab Revolt in 1936 where we see the true birth of Palestinian 
nationalism as its own separate, unique movement. The Arab Revolt was the first display 
of a patriotic movement that engaged all levels of Palestinian society in a coordinated 
movement; the symbols around which the populace rallied and the enemy they fought 
were uniquely Palestinian (Smith, 2004).  
Palestinian patriotism was mostly synthesized and developed as a result of 
Zionism. Zionist officials admitted this to themselves as early as 1921; Jacob Thon, a 
prominent settler, insisted that the Zionist movement would have to reckon with an 
oppositional nationalist movement, “We ourselves— our own [movement]— are 
speeding the development of the Arab national movement” (Morris, 2011) The increase 
in dispossession due to Jewish immigration and Hebrew Labor pushed evictees towards 
national activism. Even though the land purchases affected a very small portion of 
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Palestinian families it had disproportionate effect on nationalist movement. Yehoshua 
Porath, a Jewish historian, claims that even though relatively few Palestinians were 
dispossessed, “The Arabs came to feel like they were facing a galloping process” 
(Morris, 2011). 
Palestinian patriotism contributed to the ethos of conflict in that it was formulated 
to oppose the competing patriotism of Zionism. Palestinian nationalism was not present 
before the conflict but was rather created in the crucible of it; this means that it was 
involved in conflict before it even had clarity and thus contributed more once it had 
definition.  
Unity. Palestinian unity was severely fractured during the time period and had a 
diminishing effect on the ethos of conflict. Power struggles between prominent factions 
of Palestinian leadership (Husseinis versus Nashashibis), disagreements over what should 
be the organizing foundation of national identity (nationalist versus Islamic), land sales to 
the Zionists, and chaos during the Arab Revolt weakened the Palestinian ethos of conflict 
by fracturing the unified front they presented to the Zionists and British. The various 
divisions between Palestinian elite and the fellahin, and the different motives that 
accompanied them, prevented a single Palestinian identity from forming for the majority 
of the period.  
The biggest threat to Palestinian livelihood and way of life was the land sales 
being made to Zionist that strictly employed Hebrew Labor. The continuous sale of land 
to Jews built feelings of hostility and anger within the Palestinian community; Arab 
politicians and media openly attacked those who sold land and declared that, “by selling 
land, they sell the blood and remains of their fathers” (Morris, 2011) These people were 
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branded as traitors to the cause; however, there was so much selling of land happening 
that it was evident that prominent elites who held most of the land must be selling land as 
well.  
The Arab Revolt divided the Palestinian people into those who wanted to end the 
Revolt for economic reasons and those who wanted to continue until the British Mandate 
was removed once and for all. The Revolt created a clear polarization within the 
Palestinian people; Morris (2011) claims, “Opposition supporters were beaten and 
intimidated; political moderates, those who sold land to Jews, informers, and Nashashibi 
supporters— all fell prey to Husseini gunmen.” As the revolt progressed, it descended 
into a free-for-all among the rebels as they attacked fellow Palestinians as much as they 
did the British or Zionists. Morris (2011) says that bands or rebels clashed in the 
countryside over territory and loot while the people in the villages increasingly began to 
resist rebel efforts to extort “contributions” from them. 
Unity severely detracted from the Palestinian ethos of conflict by fracturing the 
unified front they wanted to present to the out-group. Dissension within the in-group led 
to weak Palestinian solidarity that did not allow the Palestinians to specifically define 
their identity and goals.  
 
Peace  
Peace is not an element very present in this period. As with all conflict, the 
formative years are more about how the other seven elements, the ones that maintain the 
conflict, are formed rather than the one meant to end the conflict. In this section I will 
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conclude this period by briefly providing an analysis for the element of peace for both 
groups.  
The integrationists believed that the conflict and malice from the Arabs was 
largely stemming from the displacement of fellahin labor from land purchased by 
Zionists. As a result, they believed that the issue could be resolved through dialogue and 
cooperation reflected in labor policies. Dr. Arthur Ruppin, once wrote “Though we must, 
of course, think first of giving work and bread to our own poorer brethren, we must avoid 
anything that may resemble exclusion of Arabs”  (Morris, 2011). He stressed that the 
push for exclusive Hebrew labor would alienate and anger their Arab neighbors. At the 
Fourth United Labor Convention in 1924, the body adopted “a platform that would 
protect the interests of workers from both peoples, express international solidarity and 
serve to draw together, and create a dialogue between the Zionist Labor movement and 
the authentic national movement of the Arab people” (Morris, 2011)  
Those in the separatist camp believed that only a strong show of force against the 
Arabs can discourage them in their intention to remove Zionism. Only once any hope of 
removing Zionism is defeated can there be genuine dialogue and eventual reconciliation. 
Jabotinsky popularized this argument in his Iron Wall essay, “So long as the Arabs 
harbor a desire, with the slightest hope of success, of being rid of us, there are no pleasant 
words nor heartfelt promises that will persuade them to let go of this hope” (Shlaim, 
2000). This principle required the establishment of a strong Jewish society, and to create 
a strong Jewish society the Yishuv must first extricate itself completely from the Arab 
society. The primary mechanism of this school of thought was exclusionary Jewish labor. 
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The Histadrut, founded in 1920, was a Jewish labor organization that dealt primarily in 
providing new Jewish immigrants with work and excluding Arab labor.  
In the 1937 Peel Commission the Yishuv was almost unanimously in favor of 
transfer in which a certain amount of Arabs would be displaced to make room for the new 
Jewish state. Jews had been in favor of transfer since the star of Zionism and justified 
their position by likening the Arabs in Palestine to Arabs in neighboring countries and the 
Arab world at large in contrast to the unique national struggle of the Jewish people. In 
1905, Israel Zangwill stated: “We cannot allow the Arabs to block so valuable a piece of 
historic reconstruction.… And therefore we must gently persuade them to ‘trek.’ After 
all, they have all Arabia with its million square miles.… There is no particular reason for 
the Arabs to cling to these few kilometers” (Morris, 2011). The Yishuv leadership knew 
that transfer might in practicality become expulsion and affirmed that they would use 
force if necessary. That prophecy was fulfilled after the United Nations partition of 1947.   
The Arabs ardently opposed the concept of the Jews receiving statehood on the 
land they considered to be rightfully theirs for several reasons. They viewed it as unholy 
encroachment on Muslim soil, feared that a small Jewish State would serve as a platform 
for future expansion, and objected to the idea of the displacement of several hundred 
thousand Arabs to make room for the Jewish State.  
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The Modern Day 
Today’s conflict involves different dynamics, different key players, and different 
power structures than it did before the founding of the Israeli state.  After a series of 
shocking military upsets, most notably the Six Day War, Israel expanded its territory and 
affirmed its presence in the Middle East. The end of the Six Day War saw Israel in 
control of the Gaza Strip, the West Bank of the Jordan River, and Jerusalem. Shortly 
thereafter Israel evicted the newly formed Palestinian Liberation Organization that had 
been conducting attacks on Israeli military and civilian targets to Jordan. The PLO 
continued their attacks against Israel while at the same time rebelling against Jordanian 
rule; these attacks against the Jordanian government culminated in the 1970 Palestinian 
Revolt which would later be known as “Black September” and saw thousands of 
Palestinians dead and the PLO expelled to Lebanon. Over the course of the next several 
decades Palestinian operatives carried out campaigns of plane hijackings, assassinations, 
and massacres against Israeli targets in Israel and abroad. Notable among these was the 
Entebbe plane hijacking, the Munich massacre, and the Avivim school buss massacre.  
 After Israel’s victory in the Six Day War they established military governances to 
run the affairs of the Arab populations in their newly conquered territories. Israel had 
opened their labor market to Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip but largely 
reserved Palestinians for undesirable employment Israelis did not want. Palestinians 
experiences regular hardships and degradations from Israelis; the regular 
disenfranchisement in addition to high birth rates and confiscation of land led to a general 
unrest that built until it exploded in the First Intifada in 1987. A fatal car accident 
involving an IDF truck and a civilian Palestinian car in a refugee camp sparked 
THE INFLUENCE OF POWER DYNAMICS  54       
widespread resistance and boycott of Israel in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Importantly, the Intifada was the first occurrence of widespread violence against the IDF. 
Rock and Molotov cocktails were initially responded to with live ammunition but scaled 
down to clubs and plastic bullets after the high number of children and young 
Palestinians being killed. Between civilians and IDF soldiers the Intifada claimed 160 
Israeli and over a thousand Palestinian lives (Espositio, 2005).  However, intra-
Palestinian violence was the cause of an estimated 700-800 deaths as suspected 
collaborators were executed. (Catigani, 2008). Just as important as the violence was the 
global awareness of events unfolding in the conflict. Globally disseminated photos of 
IDF soldiers beating young Palestinians with clubs and the high death count prompted 
international condemnation from the United Nations and international community 
(Cronin, 2012). The most important outcome of the First Intifada, however, was the Oslo 
Peace Accords of 1993.  
 Following the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference, the Oslo Accords were secret 
negotiations conducted by Israelis and the PLO that sought to develop a framework of 
Palestinian interim self-government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In exchange for 
this good faith the PLO promised to formally acknowledge the State of Israel, cease their 
violence against Israelis, and promote tolerance throughout the Palestinian community. 
Ultimately, the goal was a two-state solution that would end the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict.  
The IDF withdrew to various degrees in areas throughout the West Bank and 
Gaza strip and was replaced with Palestinian authority. However, the Palestinian 
Authority (created to govern the areas Israel had withdrawn from) did not hold up to their 
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pledge to denounce and incite violence. Terrorist attacks continued against Israelis and 
the continued violence created a rift in Israeli society regarding the efficacy of the Oslo 
Accords and whether or not the concessions they gave actually promoted peace or 
encouraged further terrorism. When the leaders of each side signed the agreement that 
marked the end of the first stage of negotiations there had already been suicide bombings 
throughout Israel. In 1995, the Israeli public and opposition leaders within the Knesset 
began to accuse the Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin of betraying Israel and the Jewish 
People. At a rally, Benjamin Netanyahu of the Likud Party accused Rabin of being, 
“removed from Jewish tradition and Jewish values” (Smith, 2004). Following the 
assassination of Rabin by a right-wing radical, Netanyahu won the election and 
challenged many of the fundamental tenants of the Oslo Accords. He believed that no 
concessions should be made until resolution was reached on major issues such as the 
assertions in the Palestinian National Charter that Israel had no right to exist.  
Violence escalated until 2000 when Ehud Barak, who had been elected prime 
minister the year before, and Yasser Arafat met at the Camp David Summit to try to 
negotiate a “final status” agreement. Areas of negotiations included territory, Jerusalem 
and the Temple Mount, refugees and the right of return, security arrangements, and 
settlements. The formal of the negotiations were all or nothing where nothing was 
considered binding until everything was agreed upon (Pressman, 2003). Arafat rejected 
the Israeli proposal without offering a counter-proposal and the negotiations broke down.  
The withdrawals of Palestinian territory at the beginning of the Oslo Accords had 
not materialized in the future Palestinian state that had been promised. The latest rounds 
of negotiations had produced absolutely nothing tangible for the Palestinians; they grew 
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frustrated with peaceful means as they continued with routine degradation and standard 
of living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In addition, the continued settlement 
construction that had occurred under Netanyahu and the Likud Party angered the 
Palestinians who believed that these actions went against the very purpose of the Oslo 
Accords. Palestinians were ready to rise up, and on September 28, 2000, they got the 
provocation they needed. After Ariel Sharon visited the Temple Mount, revered as the 
holiest site in Judaism and the third holiest site in Islam, Palestinians began to riot against 
this affront to Islam. This event would mark the beginning of the Second Intifada: a five-
year period of intensified violence where the Palestinians rose up against the Israelis. The 
period was characterized by Palestinian suicide bombings in civilian areas.  
The Second Intifada had two major effects: the prevalent belief in Israeli society 
that they did not have a partner for peace and the construction of the separation wall built 
along the 1949 Armistice Line. The mass Israeli casualties, mostly civilian, eroded 
confidence they had that a partner for peace with the Palestinians. After the drastic 
increase in suicide bombings in civilian areas, notably the bombing of the Dolphinarium 
nightclub in Tel Aviv, the Israeli government sought to implement a solution that could 
keep their people safe. The wall has been remarkably effective and has reduced suicide 
bombings by almost 90% (Kemp, 2006). However, this has not come without cost. While 
absolutely necessary in terms of safety, the wall has negative impacts on Palestinians and 
is frequently cited as an argument against Israel in the international community.  
In an attempt towards a final peace agreement, Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
ordered a unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2003. The withdrawal was 
celebrated as a move toward peace from the Israeli left and fiercely rebuked by his own 
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party and members of the religious right. The plan was carried out in 2005; IDF soldiers 
came to issue evacuation decrees and in many cases had to forcibly remove residents who 
refused to abandon their homes. Shortly thereafter, Hamas won elections in the Gaza 
Strip and promptly engaged in rocket fire towards Israel and orchestrated a high profile 
kidnapping of an IDF soldier. This led to the first conflict between Gaza and Israel that 
would be followed by others at an almost biannual basis until the current day. 
This leads us to the stalemate of the present day. Gaza is still ruled by Hamas and 
maintains their stance on not recognizing or negotiating Israel and actively promoting 
violence against the state and its civilians. In the West Bank, ruled by the Palestinian 
Authority, Israel still administers military governance over all the areas not ceded to 
Palestinian control in the Oslo Accords and maintains a strong military presence in areas 
like Hebron and Jerusalem. Both sides claim, often and loudly, to want a two-state 
solution but both have impediments to their full participation. There are many issues, 
both internal and external, that are preventing peace from being made.  
There are many uncertainties and shifting factors that have prevented peace; 
however one could confidently say that from the start of Zionism to the present day the 
power dynamic has shifted. The Zionist immigrants, who later became the Jews of Israel, 
were initially weak from their persecution in Europe and proportionally outnumbered in 
regard to the native Palestinians. They gathered strength and sought aid from the 
international community to achieve their goals. The Palestinians were disorganized but 
posed a clear demographic threat to the Zionists. In the modern day, however, the Israelis 
clearly have the upper hand in terms of power. Through military conquest they have 
become the deciders in the conflict while the weakened Palestinians seek support from 
THE INFLUENCE OF POWER DYNAMICS  58       
outside sources. In this chapter I will speak to the ethos of conflict in the modern period 
and how the different elements have been reprioritized in regards to the exchange in 
power between the two sides. I will argue how the Israeli rise to power has focused their 
ethos of conflict on security, self-victimhood, and positive self-image and how the 
Palestinians’ powerlessness has focused their ethos on self-victimhood, justness of their 
own goals, and delegitmization of the Israelis. For the purpose of this paper, I will 
consider the “modern” period to be the end of the Second Intifada through the present 
day. I choose 2005 as the starting point of this period after the Second Intifada because 
the implementation of the security wall and its controversy has further reinforced the 
power dynamic and has had a cascading effect on various elements of the ethos of 
conflict (Michael, 2002). 
 
 
Israel 
 Since its establishment in 1948, Israel has experienced an increasing rises in 
power in a variety of spheres including militarily, economically, and politically. In the 
Six Day War in 1967 Israel conquered large areas of strategic of strategic and lucrative 
land. Moral skyrocketed, the power of the IDF increased from its militarily significant 
holdings in the Golan and Jordan Valley, and Israel enjoyed an influx of funds from new 
tourism, donations, and oil from the Sinai Peninsula. Although it would eventually 
relinquish some of the territories conquered in the Six Day War in exchange for peace 
with its neighbors, Israel’s new territories allowed it relative security and allowed them to 
fight future wars that would not necessarily threaten its very existence. The strength of 
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the IDF itself has also greatly increased over time. A military culture synthesized through 
mandatory conscription, significant aid from the United States, and a disproportionate 
amount of the national budget on defense has allowed the IDF to become one of the most 
powerful militaries in the world. The IDF facilitates life in the West Bank for Palestinians 
living in disputed territories.  
 Israel’s economy has flourished over the years due to its quality university 
education and disproportionate contribution to global science and technology. In addition, 
Israel has a vibrant startup and venture capital country second only to Sillicon Valley; 
Google chairman Eric Schmidt claims that, “Israel has the most important high-tech 
center in the world after the United States” (Efune, 2012). Israel, despite being a nation of 
only 8 million, has the 24th highest GDP per capita of any nation. Israelis enjoy a high 
standard of living and in 2015 were ranked 19th among 187 Nations on the United 
Nation’s Human Development Index.  
In addition, following the Six Day War Jews of the diaspora began making aliyah 
in much higher numbers and Jewish organizations in America began to publicly declare 
their support. Since 1967, lobbying firms supporting Israel including the American Israel 
Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) and Christians United for Israel (CUFI) have grown 
in prominence and influence in the American political system. These lobbies exercise 
their power and influence political support of Israel by means of campaign contributions 
and creating public awareness in the media for Israel’s legitimacy. Israel has enjoyed 
recognition as a state from the United Nations and has been a permanent member since 
1949. 
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 These factors have contributed to Israel’s rise in power and have influenced its 
ethos of conflict. Now that the Israeli State has been established, one could consider the 
Israeli’s goals as largely completed. The modern Israeli collective is more focused on 
how to maintain and defend their hard-won accomplishments against constant attack. The 
conflict still continues in a violent fashion, but since Israel has the upper hand they 
consider themselves on the defensive of many conflicts and as the reactionaries to 
instigations by the Palestinians. In terms of their security as a safe, Jewish state, Israelis 
find themselves facing security issues that threaten their demographic integrity in 
addition to their physical security.  
Israelis feel that their relative position of power allows many of legitimate 
security concerns to go unaddressed; the constant threat they feel in addition to the 
flippant attitude of the international community contributes to its sense of self-
victimhood. Israel’s rise to power has prompted numerous and frequent attacks on both 
its civilian safety and legitimacy as a state. The frequency of those attacks has allowed 
self-victimhood to become a heavily emphasized element in the Israeli ethos of conflict. 
In addition, the relentless and sometimes brutal nature of these attacks has prompted 
Israelis to delegitimize Palestinians in relation to self-victimhood. Their characterization 
of the Palestinians as bloodthirsty, insatiable for conflict, and radicals only serves to 
stoke feelings of self-victimhood. In addition, Israel’s increase in power and its successes 
in various fields increase their sense of self-victimhood when they feel from the 
international communities. Despite doing everything, “right,” Israelis believe they receive 
disproportionate outrage, news coverage, and global demonization. These factors make 
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them believe that they are merely the latest manifestations of age-old anti-Semitism 
where Jews are persecuted no matter what they do. 
Israel’s dramatic and unlikely rise to prominence and prosperity has also 
influenced them to have a much higher value on their positive self-image. Israelis pride 
themselves on their accomplishments and consider themselves the pioneers and victors of 
the ancient struggle to redeem their ancestral homeland. In terms of in-group out-group 
dynamics, Israel’s position of power has manifested itself in the positive self-image it 
views itself in regards to the delegitimized Palestinians. Positive self-image manifests 
itself in Israel frequently juxtaposing its battle tactics, political intentions, and culture 
with that of the Palestinians. In this arena, Israel’s power has allowed it to equate itself 
with progress and reason and contrast it with the powerless Palestinians they describe as 
primitive.  
In this section I will provide a description of each of Israel’s predominant 
elements of the ethos of conflict now that they hold the majority of the power in the 
conflict. 
Security. Security concerns are broken down into two categories: security 
regarding the safety of citizens and the threat posed to the State of Israel itself. 
Indiscriminate Palestinian violence continually targets Israeli civilians and its effect on 
the collective Israeli mindset is easily seen in Zionist rhetoric and its prominence in 
Israeli politics. Memories of the Second Intifada supplemented by civilian-targeted rocket 
strikes from Gaza and frequencies of “lone wolf” attacks prevent many Israelis from 
envisioning a pathway to peace. Security concerns regarding physical safety are so high 
that they influence other aspects of the ethos of conflict so that each element is colored by 
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how it relates to security. In addition, Israelis fear for the security of the State of Israel 
itself regarding its identity as a Jewish State and how it is perceived in the international 
community. Security concerns are widely acknowledges as the biggest barrier to peace 
and elections are predicated on candidate’s stances on security and how their various 
policies will affect it.  
Regarding security concerns, the modern period holds little in common with 
security concerns of previous times when Israel was not as powerful. In the past, Israel 
faced direct threats to its existence from Arab states that would deploy their armies with 
the intention of destroying Israel itself. However, as Israel rose to power in the region and 
began to assert its military superiority beginning in the Six Day War the dynamics of 
Israeli security began to change. Beginning with the Second Intifada followed by the 
unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005 and the subsequent rise of Hamas 
Israel’s main enemy became non-state actors who target civilians rather than the IDF or 
country itself. This development had a major influence on policy. After the poorly 
executed war that saw heavy rocket fire into Negev communities and kidnappings 
following the withdrawal from Gaza it became clear that cease-fires and agreements held 
no weight. This furthered the public belief that Israel could not make peace with the 
Palestinians and allowed a sense of uncertainty and fear to penetrate Israeli society. In a 
press conference Bibi Netanyahu said, “Next time it will be Qassams not only on the 
Negev communities but also on Tel Aviv” (Gelvin, 2005). The fear instilled in Israelis 
also prompted heavy military response and bombardment of locations where rockets had 
been fired from. In light of terrorism and kidnappings Israel needed to show their 
enemies that they could crush them militarily.  
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 The Gaza War of 2008 commonly referred to as “Cast Lead” helped solidify the 
Israeli perception that they were not only under attack as a country but under attack as a 
civilian population. The war began in an attempt to stop Hamas from firing rockets into 
civilian areas and destroy the tunnels used to abduct soldiers. Hamas broke several 
ceasefires prompting more airstrikes from the Israeli Air Force; in a press conference a 
spokesman for Ehud Olmert said that Israel was committed to a truce but it could not 
accept a “one-sided ceasefire” and a situation where rockets are coming in everyday 
targeting Israeli civilians. The war had an undeniable effect on Israeli society as the 
constant rocket fire disrupted daily life, closed schools, and destroyed homes. In addition 
to rockets, Hamas employed psychological tactics that instilled fear and paranoia in 
Israeli society. Hamas publicly stated their intent of kidnapping Israelis and announced 
they would fire rockets on Tel Aviv; over text message, Hamas sent texts in Hebrew to 
Israeli civilians saying, “Rockets on all cities, shelters will not protect you” (Hazem, 
2009). As a result, Israeli Jews overwhelmingly supported the war and subsequent wars 
such as Pillar of Defense (2012) and Protective Edge (2014) received similar 
endorsement from the Israeli public.  
 The fear that is prevalent throughout Israeli society is not unsubstantiated; a 2009 
study by the University of Haifa found that one in every five Israelis have lost a relative 
or a friend in a terrorist attack (Kober, 2009). Media outlets for the Palestinian Authority 
and Hamas regularly incite and glorify terror. Both groups revere terrorists as martyrs and 
public spaces like parks are frequently named after terrorists (Donzis, 2014). A 2014 poll 
conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research found that 80% of 
Palestinians support attempts by “individual Palestinians to stab or run over Israelis in 
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Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank.” Terror has been on a consistent rise on an 
interpersonal basis. According to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time this 
paper is written, November 30, 2015, there has been almost 20 separate instances of lone 
wolf attacks involving individual Palestinians stabbing, shooting, or running over Jews 
with their vehicles in the last month.  
 Future policies and the framework of peace are affected by how Israel thinks it 
will affect security. After the disaster that has become Gaza, Israelis are much more 
hesitant to move forward with the concept of “land for peace.” Israel cites the continuous 
rocket fire and other forms of terror as evidence that a Palestinian State would be 
dangerous to Israelis. People claim that if the same Qassam rockets were fired from cities 
in the West Bank the Iron Dome would be rendered useless and Tel Aviv could be 
bombarded in the same manner as Sderot or Ashkelon. From a strategic standpoint, Israel 
has continuously reiterated that a withdrawal to the pre-1967 borders is not possible 
because the topography of the land makes those borders indefensible. They equate these 
borders with the paralyzing insecurity felt by Israelis before the Six Day War and even 
before the State of Israel itself, referring to them as “Auschwitz” borders (Dimant, 2014). 
In addition the physical security, Israel worries over the integrity of its Jewish character. 
It frequently demands that the Palestinian Authority recognize Israel as a Jewish state and 
the Jewish People’s right to self-determination. Another major concern is how it will 
keep its Jewish majority and maintain its democratic nature. The growing Palestinian 
population presents a threat to the mission of the State of Israel itself: a nation with a 
Jewish majority to protect Jews in a way that they were not in countries where they were 
a minority.    
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 The security element of Israel’s ethos of conflict is highly related to its self-
victimization. Physical attacks from Palestinians in addition to attacks on Israel’s 
legitimacy from the international community supports elevated feelings of self-
victimhood within Israeli society 
Self-Victimhood and Delegitimization of Palestinians. Israeli self-victimhood is 
broken into two components: their self-victimhood in relation to the Palestinians and in 
relation to the international community. In regards to the first component, Israel’s 
position of power allows it to see itself as the party continually extending its hand for 
peace but getting violence in return. Israelis believe that they have no partner for peace 
and the Palestinians are consumed by hate and a desire to kill both Israelis and Jews. 
Israelis believe that Palestinian terrorism is not contingent upon any stage or forecast in 
the peace process, but rather they commit terrorism simply because they hate Jews and do 
not want them there. In a press conference following a recent string of terror attacks, 
Natanyahu opposed the idea that Palestinians were lashing out due to frustration, 
“They're attacking us not because they want peace or don’t want peace,” he said. “It’s 
because they don’t want us here” (Goodenough, 2015). Lone wolf attacks contribute to 
this feeling of self-victimhood because they are seen as ordinary representatives of the 
greater, violent population. These attacks, in addition to proving widespread incitement 
and indoctrination of terror, occur in everyday places like bus stations or public squares 
and make Israelis believe that they cannot go about their daily tasks without fear for their 
life. Palestinian anti-Semitism is also placed in context with a larger Arab anti-Semitism. 
In “Why Israel Is the Victim,” David Horowitz (2002) asserts that Arabs, “hate Jews so 
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ferociously that they cannot live alongside them. There is not an Arab state or Arab 
controlled piece of territory in the Middle East that will allow one Jew to live in it.” 
 However a large part of Israeli self-victimhood has to do with its treatment and 
portrayal in the international community. In Israel and Zionist communities around the 
world, anti-zionism is seen as the “new anti-Semitism.” Israeli journalist Dan Horowitz 
(2015) claims that anti-zionism is the “politically correct anti-Semitism.” It is the way for 
traditional anti-Semites to continue their hatred but still be accepted in modern circles 
that reject group-based bias like anti-Semitism. Israel feels that its treatment and 
portrayal in the international community largely stems from a continuation in the ancient 
traditions of anti-Semitism. While criticism of Israel is legitimate, it is largely used in 
ways that suggest Israel is not the issue. The 3D test of anti-Semitism uses three criteria 
to distinguish criticism of Israel from anti-Semitism and has been adopted by the US 
Department of State. The criteria are delegitimization of Israel, demonization of Israel, 
and holding Israel to a double standard. These three elements and the “new anti-
Semitism” contribute to self-victimhood in regards to Israel’s position of power in that 
Israel thinks of itself, as a state and as a culture, as doing everything right only for new 
manifestations of the same hatred to appear.  
 Israel is frequently delegitimized in the media in that the Jewish people’s right to 
self-determination is portrayed as illegitimate and racist. Some refer to this as “political 
anti-Semitism,” where people deny Israel’s right to exist. It is seen that the denial of the 
Jewish people’s fundamental rights, such as self-determination, is anti-Semitic in the 
sense that the world singles out the Jews, and the Jews alone, to not receive that right 
(Cotler, 2015). In regards to demonization, Israel is frequently ascribed a gamut of evil 
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and insidious characteristics similar to Jews in the era of Christian of racial anti-
Semitism. Israel is portrayed as “the embodiment of all evil, including racism, 
imperialism, colonialism, ethnic cleansing, apartheid and even Nazism” (Cotler, 2015). 
Anti-zionist groups like Students for Justice in Palestine distribute propaganda that 
portrays Israel as the secret controller of worldwide banks and media. Pamphlets and 
tweets display Israel deliberately massacring and reveling in the deaths of civilians.  
 Israel frequently bemoans the double standard it is held to in the media and the 
disproportionate amount of coverage it gets in relation to greater atrocities.  Many Israelis 
believe that their actions are held under a microscope and held to standards not applied to 
other nations. In 2012, after receiving intense international condemnation in regards to 
what was deemed disproportionate response to Gaza rocket fire, Netanyahu issued a 
statements saying, “No government would tolerate a situation where nearly a fifth of its 
people live under a constant barrage of rockets and missile fire, and Israel will 
not tolerate this situation” (JNS.org, 2012). Movements like BDS (Boycott, Divestment, 
and Sanctions) target Israel seek to put pressure on Israel for human rights violations 
while at the same time ignoring far worse abuses in neighboring countries. Perhaps most 
importantly, the United Nations Security Council has been described by numerous 
sources such as UN Watch, the ADL, and Alan Dershowtiz as spending a 
“disproportionate amount of time,” on Israel-Palestine compares to other issues. In 2013, 
there were 21 resolutions against Israel and none against Saudi Arabia or North Korea, 
both notorious abusers of human rights violations.  
 Like self-victimhood, Israel’s positive self-image is also heavily influenced by 
their delegitimization of Palestinians. Both elements use a heavy juxtaposition stemming 
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from their differences in power to allow them a prominent position in Israeli ethos of 
conflict.   
Positive Self-image and Delegitimization of Palestinians. Israel’s rise to power 
is reflected in their positive self-image. Israelis have a strong national identity and are 
proud of the many accomplishments they have achieved in their short time as a state. 
Israel has disproportionately contributed to global technology and commerce; an example 
being drip irrigation that is used throughout the world as a method of agricultural 
efficiency and water conservation. Their positive self-image is rooted in their 
accomplishments and the sense of pride they derive from the struggle of the Jewish 
people as they realize their age-old dream of redeeming the State of Israel. At the United 
Nations General Assembly, Netanyahu declared, “In our time the Biblical prophecies are 
being realized. As the prophet Amos said, they shall rebuild ruined cities and inhabit 
them. They shall plant vineyards and drink their wine. They shall till gardens and eat 
their fruit. And I will plant them upon their soil never to be uprooted again. Ladies and 
gentlemen, the people of Israel have come home never to be uprooted again” (Times of 
Israel Staff, 2013).  
In 2014, Nefeseh B’nefesh, a nonprofit organization, released a video for Yom 
Haatzmaut (Israeli Independence Day) that captures the spirit of Israeli positive self-
image. In the video, 66 Israelis labeled as “heroes” talk about the journey and success of 
re-founding Israel. The narrative speaks to those brave souls who returned to Israel to 
achieve independence, renew their identity, and reclaim their homeland against 
opposition: “Flourishing in the wilderness, reviving the Hebrew language, building cities, 
villages, and towns, with our own economy and culture” (Nefesh B’Nefesh, 2014). 
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People who founded a new society founded on values of liberty, justice and peace; who 
would “uphold social and political equality for all of its citizens, without distinction of 
religion, race, or sex. Israel ensured freedom of conscious, and religion, education, 
culture, and language, and the safeguarding of the sanctity of the holy places of all 
religions” (Nefesh B’Nefesh, 2014).  
A large part of the Israeli positive self-image is how they contrast themselves 
against the Palestinians. In culture but also in the value they have derived from the land 
in a short span of time compared with the much larger amount of time the Palestinians 
have had with it. Israel prides itself on being a multicultural, democratic society that 
includes diversity in all levels of society including industry, the IDF, and even the 
government that has self-identified Palestinian members of the Knesset who regularly 
speak out and condemn policies. This is juxtaposed against Palestinian society, where 
Jews do not have representation in the Palestinian Authority or are even allowed in the 
Gaza Strip. Israeli and Zionist pundits around the world use contrasts to demonstrate 
superior Israeli self-image. David Horowitz (2002) summarizes this dichotomy, Israel 
“Palestinians into their communities with full rights while Arabs/Palestinians wont even 
tolerate Jews in their countries.” 
 LBGT and women’s rights and their lacking counterparts in Palestinian society 
are other big factors. Israel prides itself on being the progressive LGBT country in the 
Middle East and Tel Aviv, which is known as the “gay capital” of the Middle East, if 
famous for its Pride Week and Pride Parade that happen every summer. In contrast, 
homosexual activity is illegal in the Gaza Strip and homosexuals in the West Bank do not 
have protected rights. Outed Palestinians can even face public humiliation, torture, and 
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death(Ben-Dor, Cahana & Kagan, 2008). Israeli pundits frequently cite these facts to the 
international community and use the contrast to both delegitimize Palestinians while at 
the same time bolster their positive self-image. In Israel, women serve in the IDF, 
Knesset, and every facet of Israeli society. In fact, Gilda Meir served as the Israeli Prime 
Minister in the early 1970’s. In Gaza, women face restrictions on clothing and behavior; 
in 2010, women in Gaza were barred from smoking hookah because Hamas claimed it 
was leading to increasing divorces (Blomfield, 2010). Even more seriously, women in 
both Gaza and the West Bank are subject to honor killings as punishment for “immoral 
sexual behavior.” There were 26 honor killings in 2014 alone (Odgaard, 2014). Israeli 
and Zionist publications write pieces on women’s rights that blatantly contrast the 
differences in women’s and gay rights in Israel that serve to preserve their positive self-
image in Israel and to the international community. 
 Israel also casts itself in a superior light in terms of violence and terrorism. In 
regards to conflicts with Gaza, Israel has considered itself the most moral army in the 
world. In 2014 Richard Kemp, a British army commander, said that, “No army in the 
world acts with as much discretion and great care as the IDF in order to minimize 
damage. The US and the UK are careful, but not as much as Israel” (Harkov, 2014). 
Critics against Israeli condemnation cite practices such as Israel texting residents of a 
building that its going to be bombed or “roof knocking” in which the Israeli air force 
would drop a smaller bomb on the roof of a targeted building to warn residents to leave. 
Israel regularly uses comparison between itself and Hamas to both condemn them and 
increase their self-perception in terms of battle tactics. When it became known that 
Hamas was regularly using human shields during Operation Protective Edge, both Israeli 
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and Zionist organizations around the world released graphics showing the dichotomy of 
Israel’s iron dome versus Hamas’ human dome. These graphics showed civilians above 
and below ground with rockets raining down and slogans such as, “Israel uses weapons to 
protect its people, Hamas uses people to protect its weapons” (Gordan & Perugini, 2014). 
Israeli sanctity for life, such as releasing known terrorists to barter back kidnapped 
soldiers, is compared to Hamas-run television that proclaims, “The Al-Qassam Brigades 
love death more than you love life” (Gabbay, 2012).  
 Lastly, positive self-image is derived from Israeli response to terror and how that 
compares to Palestinian response and culture to terror. In 2015, an Israeli threw a 
firebomb into a Palestinian building that resulted in the death of a baby. Israelis and 
Zionists all over the world wasted no time condemning the act. Netanyahu labeled the 
death an act of terror and described the arsonist as a murderer; he later called Mahmoud 
Abbas to express his condolences and offer what assistance he could. This strongly 
contradicts the Palestinians who have a handbook forbidding them to say the word 
“terror,” and their refusal to condemn terrorist attacks (Abu Toameh, 2015). 
 
Palestine 
 Since the United Nations Partition Plan of 1947, the Palestinians have 
experienced the opposite turn of fortune that the Israelis have enjoyed. The Israeli 
Independence War of 1948 resulted in the Palestinian exodus that would later be known 
as the Nakba. The Nakba created hundreds of thousands of Palestinian refugees who fled 
to neighboring countries; those who tried to return to their homes were branded 
infiltrators in order to prevent them from returning. The Palestinians were subjected to 
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the treatment of the neighboring countries they fled to who often dealt with them harshly. 
In what was deemed the “Lost Years” by a Palestinian-American historian Rashid 
Khalidi, Palestinians lacked solidarity and centrality as the population was fractured 
between the West Bank, Gaza, and neighboring countries (Khalidi, 2010). The Six Day 
War further broke the cohesiveness of the Palestinians and began the military occupation 
of the West Bank and Gaza Strip that continues into the present.  
 The emergence of the PLO offered some cohesiveness and clarity to the 
Palestinian cause but their operations lacked geographic proximity and suffered from 
internally disjointed unity. Palestinians remaining in the West Bank, Gaza Strip, or East 
Jerusalem following the Six Day War have been subject to military occupation. The 
occupation has resulted in poorer economic standard of living, freedom of movement, 
and quality of life. Palestinians face daily degradations as a result of the occupation in 
addition to the other consequences of occupation; these effects have been compounded by 
the construction of the separation wall in the West Bank and the blockade in the Gaza 
Strip. In a 2005 report the United Nations claimed that the separation wall “severs 
communities, people’s access to services, livelihoods and religious and cultural 
amenities” (Sadat, 2009). As a nation or as a people, Palestinians do not enjoy the 
prosperity or freedom that Israelis do.  
 Militarily, the Palestinians are at a severe disadvantage compared to the domestic 
and foreign-financed militaristic culture of Israel. The Palestinian Authority has a small 
standing force tasked with the security of the Palestinian president and leadership. In the 
Gaza Strip, Hamas receives training and weapons from foreign sponsors such as Iran. 
The firepower they receive, however, pales in comparison with the military grade 
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firepower used by the IDF. Hamas mainly employs homemade rockets and resorts to 
tactics such as suicide bombings and kidnappings in order to have an effect.   
 Politically, the Palestinians power has been fractured through a lack of unity. 
Following the elections in the Gaza Strip in 2006 Hamas violently ousted political 
opponent Fatah and the conflict resulted in high tensions and discord between the two 
parties that continues to the current day. The two parties have radically different views 
and goals in terms of ending the conflict and Palestinian political power suffers through 
the inconsistent tactics and image they present to the international community. Hamas is 
designated as a terrorist organization by the European Union, Israel, and the United 
States; in addition, Israel refuses to negotiate with Hamas because it does not recognize 
Israel’s legitimacy as a state. The Palestinians were first given observer status at the 
United Nations in 1974 and then upgraded to the status as a non-member observer state in 
2012. Although they gained power in recognition of being a state in the United Nations, 
their observer status does not allow them to vote on resolutions.  
 The Palestinians’ lack of power has centered their ethos of conflict on three areas: 
self-victimhood, justness of their goals, and delegitimization of the Israelis. The power 
dynamic of the conflict seeps into the Palestinian collective mindset via every day 
interactions. They experience their lack of power at Israeli checkpoints when civilians 
deal with armed IDF soldiers in their everyday actions living under occupation. The 
military presence and separation wall makes them feel as if they are an inferior ethnic 
group being branded as inferior and dangerous. Militarily, the disparity in firepower 
allows Palestinians to develop a David versus Goliath mindset when they feel as if their 
homemade rockets or rocks are met with airstrikes and live ammunition. Politically, all 
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they can do is petition the world for assistance while Israel wields its power of full 
statehood. The combination of experiences born out of a lack of power creates a palpable 
sense of self-victimhood that is expressed from every part of society and also used to 
garner support from the international community.  
 The tangible effects of a lack of power that Palestinians experience that foster a 
sense of self-victimhood also help to reaffirm the justness of their own goals. Their poor 
standard of living and degraded experience resulting from living under occupation creates 
motivation to see themselves in control of their own destiny. They wish to claim their 
status a natives of the land and live as such while simultaneously protecting Islam and the 
holy sites. Palestinians recognize that it is their lack of power that keeps their goals from 
being met and therefore first and foremost wish to achieve statehood because they believe 
that self-determination will allow them to better their day-to-day existence and achieve 
their other goals that they are entitled to.  
Lastly, the lack of power causes them to have an extremely negative view of 
Israelis that manifests itself in delegitimization. Palestinians see Israelis as the source of 
their misery and humiliation and hold an extremely negative view of the people they view 
to be their oppressors. They recognize that Israel holds the power over their daily lives; 
they reconcile their discontent with their present situation by ascribing evil and malicious 
traits to those in power to make sense of their current situation. Palestinian 
delegitimization is born out of an earnest psychological reaction to their experience with 
Israeli; however, their powerlessness also allows them to use delegitimization in a 
strategic way to the international community. To the rest of the world, Palestinians 
describe Israelis as racist, colonialist regime that is intends to disenfranchise an 
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indigenous population. In the 21st century awakening of the awareness of racism, 
colonialist power dynamics, and the exploitation of indigenous populations these 
accusations have put significant pressure on Israel to change its policies. Even more 
serious, during armed conflicts Israel is repeatedly accused of deliberately targeting 
civilians, collective punishment, and genocide. The power dynamic between the two 
groups allows Palestinians to cast these traits onto the Israelis in a way that mobilizes 
support for their goals.  
In this section I will provide a description of each of Palestine’s predominant 
elements of the ethos of conflict now that they hold the minority of the power in the 
conflict.  
Self-Victimhood. As the relatively powerless player in the current power 
structure, a large part of the modern Palestinian ethos of conflict constitutes self-
victimhood. Palestinians consider themselves underneath the heel of a foreign oppressor 
that takes happiness in their suffering. The presence of the IDF in the West Bank and the 
facilitation of supplies and energy in the Gaza Strip reduce quality of life for Palestinians. 
IDF checkpoints in the West Bank impede rights to transportation and enhance the 
physical and cultural separation between Israel and Palestine. More importantly, these 
checkpoints are a source of daily abuse and degradation that Palestinians experience at 
the hands of the Israelis. Testimonies collected by Ynet documented the daily abuses and 
humiliations that Palestinians experience on a daily basis, “There was a case in which a 
military policeman pushed an Arab on the floor and simply started kicking him. In 
another case, two Arabs began fighting and instead of separating between them, the 
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soldiers stood by, laughed and applauded" (Zitun, 2015). The blockade of Gaza holds up 
needed supplies and contributes to the “ghettoization” of life there (Ratner, 2014). 
 Their relative position of powerless and the ethnic divide that defines the conflict 
makes Palestinians feel as if the Israelis are treating them as second-class citizens at best 
and less than humans at worst. One Palestinian activist described the occupation as a 
system that “discriminates between people based on race, nationality, ethnicity, and 
religion” (Norton, 2015). In the West Bank, Jews are under the governance of civil law 
while Palestinians live under military law. This means that, “while their Jewish neighbors 
come and go freely, West Bank Palestinians are subject to arbitrary arrest and detention, 
and to the denial of freedom of movement; they are frequently barred from access to 
educational or healthcare facilities” (Makdisi, 2014). Palestinians believe that their lives 
are not valued and they are indiscriminately killed to prove a point or for no reason at all; 
this attitude is seen in times of “collective punishment” in Gaza for Hamas rocket fire. 
They believe that Israel “has not only a complete lack of sanctity for Palestinian life but a 
willingness to kill large amounts of Palestinians in “incremental Genocide” (Ratner, 
2014).  
 Politically, Palestinians feel themselves at the mercy of the international 
community. Having a fractured political system and no real authority in the United 
Nations, all Palestinians can do is plead with the powers at be to put pressure on Israel. 
Militarily, they feel that they do not stand a chance in the armed struggle against Israelis. 
What weapons they do have are given by foreign powers such as Iran; in terms of arms, a 
crucial element of intractable conflict, Palestinians are the victims in that they have no 
control over the armed struggle.  
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Justness of Goals. Opposite from the Israelis, the Palestinians have not achieved 
their goals, and the lack of power and the self-victimhood they feel because of it 
enhances the necessity and justness of their goals. Palestinians strongly believe that their 
present situation will be remedied by self-determination and the control it will bring over 
their own destiny. Palestinians, loudly and frequently, claim their need for an 
independent state that will rid them of Israeli oppression. In addition, Palestinians claim 
that they own the holy sites the Israelis desecrate and it is their duty to keep them sacred.  
The justness and importance of Palestinian goals are reflected in the acceptance 
Palestinians have for the tactics used to realize them. In what has come to be known as 
the “despair argument,” Palestinians are driven to violence because Israel is so 
relentlessly cruel and oppressive and they see no other options to advance their aims 
(Leibovitz, 2015). Israel, “with the occupation, increasing settlements, checkpoints, lack 
of economic and educational opportunities, large prison complexes and police/Israel 
Defense Forces brutality” leads to this despair (Mason, 2015). 
These agents have “nothing to lose” and as long as their actions are aimed at 
ending the occupations, it doesn’t matter what they do (Ravid, 2015). This rationale, of 
the oppressed Palestinian at the end of his rope, is used to justify and glorify individual 
attacks on Israelis. Those who die in an attack on Israelis are considered martyrs like the 
Palestinian heroes of the Black Hand before the establishment of Israel. They are 
celebrated within Palestinian society but, in the international community, their actions are 
depicted as the last resort of a desperate person. After a Palestinian fired on Israelis in 
Hebron Abbas chose to speak of the economic situation caused by Israeli occupation that 
leads the Palestinian nation to a “state of despair and stress” (Times of Israel Staff, 2015). 
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After a young boy stabbed an Israeli and was injured by IDF response, an image of the 
young boy bleeding on the ground was circulated on the Internet. In a press release, 
Abbas said, “We will not give in to the logic of brute force and policies of occupation and 
aggression practiced by the Israeli government and its herds of settlers who engage in 
terrorism against our people and our holy places and our homes and our trees, and the 
summary execution of our children in cold blood, as they did with the child Ahmed 
Manasra and other children in Jerusalem and other places” (Eisenbud, 2015).  
Delegitimization of Opponent. Similar to self-victimhood and justness of goals, 
delegitimization of Israelis stems from the collective experience that Palestinians feel as a 
result of the power dynamic. A critical component of Palestinian culture is their 
delegitimization of Israel to their own people and the international community. Due to the 
drastic imbalance in power, Israelis and Jews are viewed as usurpers, destroyers, and 
defilers. The Hamas charter is outwardly anti-Semitic and includes claims that Jews were 
behind world disasters and are planning to take over the world. It presents Jews as the 
fundamental enemy of Islam and says Jihad against Jews is a duty. A segment on 
Palestinian Authority media features children saying “Jews are barbaric monkeys, sons of 
pigs, brought up on spilling blood, the most evil among creations,” to the applause of an 
audience (Palestinian Media Watch, 2013). Another features an artist explaining his 
painting that depictures a dragon wearing a kippah with a Palestinian child in its mouth, 
“Zionists are monsters that revel in the butchery of children” (Palestinian Media Watch, 
2012). 
A 2012 study of Palestinian Textbooks discovered several themes: denying 
Israelis to the land and holy sites and demonization. The books deny Jews historical 
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precedence to the land and refer to them as “inhabitants,” rather than Israelites, Jews, or 
Hebrews. Jewish holy sites (Western Wall, Tomb of the Patriarchs) are described as 
Muslim ones that Jews usurped. In the books, Zionism is not portrayed as a Jewish 
National Movement but as a racist, colonialist movement connected to western 
imperialism. In context of their historical connection as an adversary of Mohammed, 
Jews are described as snakes that use tricks and violate treaties. Jews are described as 
murderers in vivid detail, and Israel is named the source of all evil with an exhaustive list 
of crimes including murderers of women/children and desecrators of holy sites (Arnon, 
2012). 
In accordance with the power structure, Israel is described as this gargantuan 
force pummeling the defenseless Palestinians that serves to delegitimize Israel to both the 
Palestinian and international community. Lethal responses to attacks on Israelis are often 
described as executions and are reported as such in the media. In conflicts with Hamas, 
Israeli response to rocket fire that kills civilians is often described as genocide; during the 
summer of 2014, Abbas accused Israel of committing genocide at the United Nations. In 
a larger scope, wars such as Operation Cast Lead is framed against wars against the 
Palestinian people rather than as wars against Hamas.  
After World War Two, long-standing practices such as colonialism began to be 
greatly frowned upon with other virtues such as racism. Israel, as the dominant power, is 
placed in context with other western, imperial countries that disenfranchise and abuse 
indigenous people for the land. Palestinian news outlets and anti-Zionist publications 
characterize Israel as racist and refer to their intent to ethnically cleanse the region and 
displace the indigenous population. Organizations like Students for Justice in Palestine 
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conduct “Israeli Apartheid Week” that likens Israel’s practices to the racist South African 
regime. Labels are used strategically, particularly within the Palestinian Authority. In the 
Palestinian Terminology Guide put out by the Palestinian Authority, the book instructed 
people to say “Israeli colonialist occupation” instead of Israel and “Israel Occupation 
Force” rather than Israel Defense Force. 
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Conclusion 
Like all intractable conflicts, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is a conflict that has 
spanned generations and is influenced by a multitude of historical and environmental 
factors. Originally the conflict developed as a competition between two national identities 
that strived to use the same land to realize their goals of self-determination. The justness 
and necessity of the Jews’ goals were made apparent after a fundamental change in 
Jewish behavior elicited the same hateful response in the Gentile communities they 
resided in. When their millennia-old persecution reached a culmination in the dawn of 
racial anti-Semitism, the Jews decided that a homeland (and later a state) in their 
ancestral homeland was the only way to achieve safety and well being for their people. 
The Palestinian identity and the goals attached to it, on the other hand, coalesced in 
response to the unique pressures they faced opposed to other Arab peoples. Those unique 
challenges, Zionism and the British Mandate, isolated them from the greater cause of 
pan-Arabism and forced them to define themselves in a solitary nationalistic manner.  
In the earliest period of the conflict, both sides had equitable power that 
manifested itself in similar prioritizations of the ethos of conflict. Both sides have in-
group and out-group elements of conflict that were all affected by the element of security. 
While efforts at coexistence and concepts of peace were present, they were not 
thoroughly pursued as both groups’ justness of their own goals, delegitimization of their 
opponent, and positive self-image prevented them from humanizing the other and 
prevented them from considering the validity of their goals.  
In the modern period, the balance of power has shifted dramatically and this has 
manifested itself in different prioritizations of power for each group. For Israel, security 
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is tantamount as it seeks to protect and maintain its position of power. The continuous 
attacks on that power foster a sense of self-victimhood in Israeli community. That self-
victimhood is supplemented by a barbarous view of the Palestinians that serves to create 
an evil monster they must protect themselves from. Lastly, their position of power and 
their various successes promotes a collective positive self-image that is often juxtaposed 
with their disdainful view of the Palestinians.  
From the Palestinian perspective, their powerless position leads them to prioritize 
self-victimhood in their ethos of conflict above all else. Their daily suffering and lack of 
control over their own destiny promotes a feeling of helplessness and victimhood that is 
prevalent throughout society. This self-victimhood born out of their lack of power 
emphasizes the justness and necessity of their goals; goals that they view would liberate 
them from their present condition. Finally, their powerless position leads to extreme 
delegitimization of the Israelis. Viewed as their captors and oppressors that take glee in 
their misery, Palestinian delegitimization of Israel is present in every rung of society from 
the government to popular culture.  
It goes without saying that peace is the ultimate goal for any intractable conflict. 
However the makeup of every conflict is vastly different depending on the defining 
identity of groups involved, the source of and logic behind their goals, and the historical 
and present circumstances that have led to the present situation. The makeup and 
prioritization of ethos of conflict will be different for different groups; therefore, the 
peace that is sought for each circumstance must address the unique ethos of conflict 
involved in those conflicts.  
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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the most studied and spoken of 
intractable conflicts in history. Masses of time and resources have been devoted to 
finding a solution. To suggest a specific solution would be completely beyond the scope 
of this paper, but I will claim that any proposed solution will have to address and mediate 
the most important elements of both sides ethos of conflict that are barring peace. Israelis 
must first and foremost be assured their security, both in the safety of their citizens and 
the integrity of their state. I believe that once this is solved it will lessen their sense of 
self-victimhood and allow them to see Palestinians as having just goals as well. Greater 
security will also allow them to lower their guard and recognize the humanity in the 
Palestinians. For the Palestinians, their suffering must be alleviated by some means so 
that they can see Israelis in a more positive way and consider them worthy of peace. This 
increase in relative power will lessen their sense of self-victimhood and allow them a 
greater sense of agency over their own destiny that will allow them to recognize and 
remove their self-constructed barriers to peace.  
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